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PREFACES
The question of control versus the free market de­
termination of the foreign exchange rate has become vital­
ly important due to the increased emphasis that has been 
placed upon international political and economic unity as 
a means of securing world peace. Nationalistic restric­
tions, such as exchange controls, imposed on foreign trade 
are a serious obstacle to the success of the plans for 
world unity. On the basis of economic theory and an un­
biased appraisal of the facts it would seem that the na­
tions of the world would be all to happy to return to 
freely determined foreign exchange rates, however, as with 
all types of restrictions, exchange controls are easy to 
impose, but most difficult to remove, fbe difficulties 
are intensified when nations are unwilling or politically 
unable to pursue the policies needed to make the correc­
tions which would make controls unnecessary. In the eight 
year period 1945-53 following world War 11 Canada has been 
the only major nation to succeed in completely removing 
foreign exchange controls* The Canadian experience offers 
an important lesson to nations in a similar situation.
In the post-World War II period administration of 
the foreign exchange rate has been an extremely trouble-
some aspect of international trade policy for many coon* 
tries#; In the immediate postwar period the majority of 
nations./conUntied to use their wartime exchange control# 
as ;a mean# of .dealing with the problems that'arose in 
their hal#nce of payments * In discussions of bo th econom­
ic theory arid policy it ha# been repeated oyer and Oyer 
again. that- .exchange controls are only an expedient device 
used to secure time to make fundamental adjustments* fa 
fact* however, exchange control# have persisted since 
their widespread introduction during the depression of the 
10:$0l#^;a»d at present it appears that they will persist 
much ■lunger*' iSvidence indicates that once a nation im-
i "  •  .
poses ©xchangeeontrols they, assume a more or less perma­
nent character and it is only with great difficulty that 
a nation can remove them, if, indeed* they are ever com* 
pletely removed#
the theoretical issues involved in the use of ex# 
change controls" are guile.clear*■ the exchange rate is the 
liiijk. be'tween 'the-internal and external -sector# of a par­
ticular national economy* it is through the balance of 
payments and' the exchange rate that external factors and 
event# affect the domestic economy; the classical theory 
of |international'--trade attempts to formulate and present ■ 
ther free functioning of this mechanism in hypothetical and
abstract theoretical terms, the function of exchange con­
trols, has, on the other hand, always been ®justified1* on 
political and social grounds. One does not argue with the 
theory of international trade and the equilibrating fune - 
tion of the exchange rate that the theory presents* Hew- 
ever, one may easily dispute the desirability of an ad­
justment in the domestic economy that is necessary to 
bring external trade into balance, especially when such 
adjustments are fundamental and have far-reaching social 
effects, in the classic general theory of international 
trade and the determination of the exchange rate social 
questions are, ignored as are other facts such as a na­
tion's relative state of economic development and the par­
ticular national economic and social environment, these 
factors, however, are of primary importance to a national 
policy making body that is attempting to evaluate the ef­
fect of the exchange rate upon the domestic economy. 
Therefore, one of the most significant independent vari­
ables in the’'existence of exchange controls is not Econom­
ic theory, but the point, of view of the national policy 
making administration# the classic economic policy of 
free trade, which is a derivative of economic theory, is 
advocated in principle throughout the world, but in prac­
tice many policy making groups find that it is advanta­
vi
geous to ignore the -theory and policy when they are deal*
IS . .
ing with real situations and political pressure is brought 
to bear. Consequently, to understand a particular na­
tion *s approach to the question of exchange control it is 
necessary to take into account all the special factors and 
situations that a national policy making body must consid­
er,. Only when all these factors are considered can one 
begin to understand a phenomena like exchange control that 
exists in the real world, but which is impossible and un­
necessary in the perfect world visualized by economic 
theory,
Canada*s experience with exchange control offers an 
excellent opportunity to study how in practice such con­
trols originate, are applied, and, especially in the case 
of Canada, how the controls may outlive their usefulness. 
The most important aspect of the Canadian experience is 
that, due to the unique Canadian position in foreign trade, 
the Canadian dollar is one of the few important currencies 
in the world that has passed through the full cycle of 
control and has returned to the free determination of the 
external rate, A.case study of the Canadian decision to 
free exchanges, the important factors in the process that 
led to this decision, and the relation of the actual expe­
rience to economic theory may, it is Hoped, help to shed
some light on possible ways of solving sisailar problems in 
other nations^;
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CHAPTER I
THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 
I * THE I NFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY
One of the most striking geophysical aspects of Cana­
da is the fact that natural physical barriers running in a 
northerly and southerly direction divide the country into 
four distinct geographic areas on an easi-west plane# These 
areas and the barriers that create the® are as follows!
(1) the Maritime Provinces (Prince Edward Island* Nova Sco­
tia, and New Brunswick)* which make up the southeastern coast 
of Canada* are separated from the rest of the nation by the 
difficult terrain in which the Appalachians meet the Canadi­
an Shield at the northern projection of the international 
boundary line* (2) Central Canada (the Provinces of Ontario 
and Quebec * particularly the area known as the St* Lawrence 
Lowlands* comprising the Niagara Peninsula and the valleys 
of the Ottawa and St* Lawrence rivers) is isolated from the 
western prairie region by eight hundred miles of barren 
country in which the Canadian Shield meets the Great Lakes * 
(3) the Prairie Provinces (Manitoba* Saskatchewan* and Alber­
ta) are cut off from the Pacific coast by the northern exten­
sion of the Rocky Mountains* (4) the Pacific coast Province 
of British Columbia* which lies on the western side* is large'
2
ly isolated from the rest of Canada by the Eocky Mountain 
barrier,
A further complication and limitation of the Canadian 
geographic situation is the fact that the region to the 
north of each of these geographic areas is generally forest 
or tundra wasteland. The situation then is one in which the 
real shape of Canada as an economic and social unit is that 
of a narrow strip running east and west which is bordered in 
the north by tundra wastes and in the south by the United 
States# This strip, however, is not continuous but divided 
into four areas as described above# The result of this geo­
graphic configuration is that east-west transportation and 
communication is difficult and costly; a situation that has 
fostered the development of reasonably discrete economies in 
each of the geographic areas. While it is true that the se» 
riousness of this condition has been somewhat mitigated by 
the development of railroads and other forms of transporta** 
tion, yet many of the geographic handicaps to economic inte­
gration still persist, with more than vestigial remnants, 
and traces of the old economic isolation that existed before 
the new forms of transportation can still be found. It is 
this situation that leads McLeod to summarize the Canadian 
economy as "Canada is not so much a single economy as a fe­
3
1
deration ©f diverse economies."
II. THE CANADIAN BALANCE SHEET
Perhaps the best approach to the problem of summa­
rizing the resources and activities of the Canadian economy 
is in forms resembling the corporate balance sheet and in­
come statement. The balance sheet,which is concerned with 
an account of the economy*s human, natural, and man-made re­
sources, will be treated at this point.
The population of Canada is much like that of the 
doited States in that it has the rather unique characteris­
tic of being non-native or immigrant in origin* Because of 
this fact the economic development of Canada has been inti­
mately associated with and dependent upon the flow of immi­
grants* Evidence of this dependence is found in the fact 
that in the last decade the population of Canada has, part­
ly as a result of natural increase and partly as a result of 
immigration, grown from eleven and a half million in 1941 to 
fourteen million in 1952. This represents an increase of 
sixteen percent in Canada as compared with only twelve per­
cent in the United States during the same period. The dif­
1Alexander M. McLeod, "Maintaining Employment and In­
come in Canada," (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, 1949), p. 28.
ference between the American and Canadian figure is mainly 
due to immigration.2 Huch of Canada’s future economic pros- 
perity is dependent upon the continuation of this inflow of 
immigrants, because as the nation’s capital resources grow, 
as they are doing at present, the greater the manpower re­
quired to utilize them. It does not appear that the present 
population could multiply fast enough to meet the require­
ments, therefore, it is necessary for Canada to have a con­
tinuous inflow of immigrants if the present rate of indus­
trial development is to continue. However, it would be er­
roneous to take the view that iust the continued supply of 
immigrants is the sine qua non of Canadian* economic develop­
ment, because, as N. Burton Hurd points out, **. . .in the 
past, Canada’s population growth, rather than being limited
by a shortage of available settlers was regulated by exter-
3nal forces largely beyond her immediate control*n The ex­
ternal forces to which Hurd refers are the world markets for 
Canadian export commodities. It folloirs that successful po­
pulation assimilation in Canada is dependent upon the coadi-
%raham F. Towers, “Current Banking Problems,*1 Pro­
ceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Pacific Northwest ConTer- 
ehc'e ' on ’‘Banking {SeaitleY State College of Washington,19^3), 
ip.' '&•
%llliam Burton Hurd, “Demographic Trends in Canada," 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci- 
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tions in the world markets in which Canada mast sell a large 
portion of her produce. Consequently, Canada is in a posi* 
tion where she must not only depend upon external sources for 
a supply of immigrants necessary to keep her population grow­
ing in proportion to needs, hat also must depend upon extern 
nal conditions to make, the continued growth possible.
In relation to the vast land area of Canada the pre­
sent population is very sroall, the present total population 
of 14,009,429 results in an average distribution of only 
3*8$ persons per square mile for the total Canadian area of 
3,845,144 square miles* However, this distribution figure 
is very deceptive since it seems to indicate that Canada is 
only sparsely settlpd* On the contrary, some areas are 
densely populated, for example. Prince Edward Island with 
45.07 persons per square mile and Nova Scotia with 30*98 per­
sons per square mile. As previously noted only, a small por­
tion of the total Canadian area comprises the economic and 
social unit of the nation* It is within this small area of 
roughly 800,000 square miles that the population of Canada 
is concentrated, the remainder being sparsely populated by 
persons living on outposts where they carry on same, mining 
and fur trading* The population, however, is not diatribe 
uted evenly within the small concentrated area that makes up 
the economic and social unit* the largest concentrations of
population are in the Provinces! of Ontario and Quebec in 
Central Canada* These two Provinces alone account for sixty 
percent of the total Canadian population and five and a half 
raillion of the seven and a half rail!ion urban dwellers*
These population figures seem to indicate that only a small 
portion of Canada is undergoing any intensive economic de­
velopment. -fSls condition becomes more evident when the 
distribution of population is related to natural resources.
Concerning mineral resources, Canada is one Of the 
most richly endowed nations in the world today. However, 
many of these resources are undeveloped due to the economic 
disadvantage of high transportation costs imposed by the 
vast area and difficult terrain of Canada, ©espite this 
handicap the extractive industries are one of the most ener­
getic segments of the Canadian economy. Oil can be cited as 
one of the numerous examples of Canada’s richness in natural 
resources. Table I shows that since 1940 Canada has devel* 
oped oil producing areas in Alberta which at present are 
producing ninety-six percent of all Canadian oil. The pic* 
tore seems to bid fair for the future of Canada who has been 
a major importer of petroleum in the past* However, it is 
typical of the Canadian situation that, because of transpor­
tation difficulties, the oil produced mainly in the north­
west cannot economically reach the large markets jg the east#
7
tAJBIl I
QUAHtltlES ABS VALUES OF CffiJDS PETROLEUM PRODUCTION 
IS CASAM, 3T PROVINCES, 1942-1951
Year New Ontario Alberta Saskat- Northwest total 
Brunswick ehewan territories Canada
Quantities (in barrels)
1942
19431944
1945
1946
28*089
24,530
23,296
30,140
28,584
143,845
132,492
125,06?
113,325123,082
10,117,0739,601,530
8,727,366
7*979*786
7,137,921
75,789 
293.750 
1,223,675 
14,374 345,171 118,686 177,282
10,364,796 
10,052,302 
10,099,404 
8,482,796 
7,585,555
194? 
19 48
19491950
1951
23,129
21,37219,544
17,13?15,000
131,295
176,989260,670
250,655201,800
6,770,47?
10,888,59220,087,418
27,548,16946,403,000
540,117
849,166
782,188
1,041,098
1,250,000
227,4?4 
350,541 
155,528 186,729 
215,000
7,692,49212,286,660
21,305,348
29,043,788
48,096,800
Values (in Canadian dollars)
1942
19431944
19451946
39,46734,342
32,832
42,413
,40,018
306,242
311,356296,420
268,478
291,719
15,514,66515.724,518
14,468,061
13,169,692
14,347,933
• • ■
15»! 362 
135,990
108,47?
400,201
632,587
136,303
173,392
15,968,851
16,470,417
15.429,900
13,632,248
14,989,052
194?
1948
19*9
1950
1951
32,381
29,920
27,362
23,992
21,000
350.000 
608,109 901,143
892.000 
706,000
18,078,90?
35,127,75158,999,936
82,216,492
118,684,350
614,156
976,541
836,941
1,134,7971,562,000
500,238
676,574
353,108
352,656
404,200
19,575,682
37,418,89561,118,490
84,619,937
121,407,550
Source: Canada Year Book: 1952-53. p. 529*
Therefore it is cheaper for eastern users to import Venezue­
lan or American oil* Barring the possibility of developing 
low cost means of transportation, the Canadians hope that 
they will at least be able to reach a balance in which they 
will be exporting as much oil as they import.^
Other important mineral developments include aluminum 
in British Columbia and iron ore in Quebec and Ontario*
J* i. McCully, an executive of the Bank of Montreal, has 
said that recent discoveries make Canada a land of even 
greater promise than the United States in the next decade*® 
The extractive industries also offer an excellent 
example of the tremendous expansion programs that are now 
under way in Canada* These programs are the result of new 
discoveries, but possibly even more, the result of the in­
creased demand by countries such as the United States for 
raw materials for their speeded up armaments programs. Ta­
ble II shows the proposed expenditure in this area of the 
economy and the expected increase -in productive capacity*
It will be this increase in productive capacity, which in
^Canadian Grade Petroleum Situation,11 Canada Tear 
Book? 1B52-53, pp. 526-27* ■ r:'"r"ri,r:v 1
®*Tohn E. HcCully, ^Prospects for Creator Industrial 
Expansion in Canada;1* Commercial and Financial Chronicle. 
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TABLE |I
BBVBLOfWEfeU OP « » f » W  IMPOSES? EESOtJfiGPS
‘ m m m r W 5 Q - l $ &  ■ ■ 
pass? i
n f m  tmtsmstoi iwm&sm- m  
.■ m m  m m m w s ,  amb mcsiKir
(Millions of Canadian Dollars)
f.
I n v © e t m © a i
Industry ,1950 
(Actual)
1951
(Prel.j
falue of Expansion 
Projects M m  Being 
undertaken for Cora* 
1 pletion in 1955 or 
Before
Aluminum smelting 18*2 233
v buvT nOIî lfsFryUo .filQ vAa.8
Smelting, refining, and 
processing 
Iron ore mining 
Primary iron and steel
#
192
5.7
15.?
5*0
23.8
66.9
150
226
88
Petroleum and natural gas*
(a) Exploration and
flsreinpssai*
(b) frsnsmission and
refining :
Chemical produets*#
fotals
<&*>
21.5
32.8 • 
160.?
70*9
37-7
6A.3
286,8
3 0 0
213
127
1 *3 3?
Kydro-eiectrie-power 3^.5 %G3.8 1,200
•Excluding acquisition Of land rights. 
••Including jtetro-chemic&l projects.
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TABLE II (continued)
PART II
SELECTED MINERALS} ESTIMATES 
Of TOTAL PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY 
(Thousands of Short Tons Unless Otherwise Stated)
Materials
ActualOutput
1950
Estimated
Capacity
1950
Estimated
Capacity
1955
Percent Increase 
la Capacity 
1950-55
Petroleum (crude)*
1,000 bble. per day 80 80 250 210
Primary aluminum 395 *15 603 *5Iron ore 3.617 3,617 19,000 *30Copper (all forms) 262 272** 300 10
Lead (all forms) 170 190** 205 8
Zinc (all forms) 311 320** *06 27
Nickel (all forms) 123 137 155 13Tungsten
(U03 content) 0.001 0.001 2 * •
Cohalt 0.313 0.313 0,600 95Magnesium 1.8 5 .0 5.0 0
Dolmen!te 100 100 550 *50
Primary steel 
ingot 3,300 3,700 *,*00 21
Elemental sulphur « » a • 81 * ♦
•Maximum economic rate— annual average.
••Eased on the highest quarterly rate of output during 1950*
Source; Hansard, Oct. 19, 1951, as quoted by: Investment Broker 
Association Comalttee on Canada, Commercial and financial Chronicle. 
GLB3V (Deo. 13, 1951), 2271.
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most cases is far xa excess of what the Canadian economy can 
itself consume, that will be meant for the export trade.
There is also another type of natural resource with 
which Canada has been especially blessed— fertile land.
Even though it is true that the area of fertile land is lim­
ited and that at present, if new developments were started, 
it would have to be on submarginal land, there is still, 
however, some hope for continued agricultural development in 
the Canadian economy since there is ample evidence that the
ir,
present agricultural development is extensive rather than 
intensive* One of the best indications of this is that at 
present the largest single crop is wheat which requires a 
great deal of land for its cultivation. The fertility of 
the soil is evidenced by the fact that the wheat farmers are 
capable of producing crops so much in excess of the Canadian 
domestic demand that wheat is one of the largest Canadian 
exports. If Canada lacks anything in the way of land assets, 
it is diversified farm land. The climate and soil condi-
*
tions lisait this type of farming to mainly some areas in the 
Earitime Provinces, the eastern section of Central Canada, 
and the far western section of the Prairie Provinces.
The type of industry that the Canadian economy with 
its wealth of natural resources and relative shortage of 
manpower is best suited to carry on is one that requires a
12
high degree hf capital.afiliaatioa. Consequently, Canadian 
industry is not generally in the highly industrialized , 
class} it is chiefly concerned with the processing of raw 
materials, this type of industrial activity requires large 
capital outlays for bulky equipment and large plants*
To sum up, Canada with its vast area <Some of which 
has not been adequately explored) and abundant resources 
(some of which cannot be developed because of high labor and 
transportation costs) constitutes a great potential develop* 
ment* Canada, then, is a nation that is favored on the as­
set side of the balance sheet* Xt is not just the fact that 
she possesses these riches that is significant} rather it is 
their location and the particular way they are being uti­
lized that has the distinguishing effect on the Canadian 
economy*. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the actual 
distribution of resources and the industries based on them 
to appreciate their contribution to the nafioa*s economy*
The Maritime Provinces account for about ten percent 
of Canada*s population* The chief industries are agricul­
ture , fishing, forestry, and mining (especially coal in le­
va Scotia)* The manufacturing enterprise of this area has a 
difficult time competing with Central Canada for the general 
Canadian market* This difficulty is especially manifest in 
the marketing of coal and steel because of the nearness of
13
American sources to the principal industrial market for 
these commodities in Central Canada,
Economically the most ̂ important district of Central 
Canada is the St, Lav/re nee Lowlands which is made up of the 
narrow strip lying between the Canadian Shield to the north 
and the international boundary to the south. This area ac­
commodates over sixty percent of the nation*s population.
It is within this region that the most important development 
of Canadian industry has taken place. One of the chief con­
tributing reasons for this development is the proximity of 
cheap abundant water power, but an even more important fac­
tor is the fact that the Lowlands is situated in a position 
that is easily accessible to eastward trade with Europe by 
sea through the St. Lawrence. Industry is not the only 
economic activity of the region. To the north of the Canadi­
an Shield agriculture, forest products, and mining are also 
important. Huch of the Canadian production of gold and base 
metals comes from this north central zone. The lack of coal 
has not hampered the growth of heavy industry in the Low­
lands, because of the nearness of American fields and the 
economic advantage of cheap transportation over the Great 
Lakes. The heavy demand of Central Canadian industry for 
American coal has tended to develop strong trade ties be­
tween this area and the United States. The Lowlands also
14
acts as the central distributing and transshipping point for 
all of Canada. The greatest share of the exports of this 
region goes to the United States; the region also accounts 
for a large share of Canadian imports in the form of indus­
trial raw materials, component parts, and heavy machines 
which are used to further the industrialization of the area* 
This vast concentration of the manufacturing of the 
nation into one comparatively small area can be explained by 
the fact that it is the one area that is centrally located 
and has the advantage of natural lines of east-west communi­
cation and transportation, plus easy and cheap means of 
southward transportation* The economic significance of the 
Central Canadian region is that historically it has served 
as the hub from which expansion has taken place* However, 
because of the lack of large population movements, industry 
has stayed concentrated in the area and economic development 
became largely a process of opening up more and more re­
sources in the interior and bringing them out to the markets 
of the world* The Lowlands is the natural distribution cen­
ter for this expansion* The home market in Canada has been 
steadily growing, but the production of important basic com­
modities has always been far ahead of domestic consumption; 
this situation has made the existence of a central concen­
tration point for export trade necessary and profitable.
15
the Prairie Provinces in the interior plains region 
account for something over twenty percent of the Canadian 
population* .Agriculture is the principal Industryof the ' 
praifies* although there are somecomaercial forest products 
found, andsom© extractive industry, especially coal and Oil 
in Alberta. However, wheat growing dominates the area* the 
wheat crop which is grown in this region is one of the main*-* 
stays of Canadian export trade, fh® market for much of the 
crop is western Europe, this market has been traditionally 
served through feritaia, mainly by the Liverpool grain ex* 
change.
fritisfe Columbia, the last of the economic regions of 
Canada, has about six or seven percent Of the total popula­
tion* fhe principal products of this region come from the 
mines, fishing, and agriculture of the area. Much of the 
produce of the region is sold in the Prairie Provinces .or 
exported to the western section of the United States* Since 
the opening of the Panama Canal made cheap ocean transport 
available,, many products,, especially forest products* are 
sold in the eastern United States and Burope.
It appears that because of the geographic* economic, 
and social reasons the Canadian economy has developed along 
■ the lines of a wheel? Central Canada is: the .hub"fro® which, 
radiates the population and manufactured goods of the nation*
16
the most distinct feature resulting from this condition of 
the Canadian economy is the concentration of production on 
just a few major products which can he produced in large 
quantities at low cost* Consequently* Canadian economic 
history has been; the story of a development based upon one 
or a few staple commodities such as wheat, lumber’, pulp and 
paper, fish, and base metals* this is one of the most sig­
nificant aspects of the economy because, judging from pre­
sent standards of consumption, it appears that there is lit­
tle chance of having in Canada for many years to come suffi­
cient urban population to consume the present surpluses of 
the leading products*6 Therefore, the Canadian stake in in­
ternational trade is high, and trade matters are one of the 
principal concerns of the nation* Confirmation of this con­
tention will be found in the following analysis of the Cana­
dian income statement*
III. THE CANADIAN INCOME STATEMENT
The foregoing presentation of Canadian resources has 
given some indication of what the Canadian economy is* The 
following brief survey of the Canadian net national produc­
tion of commodities and the balance of payments on current
%urd, 0£.
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account will attempt to show what it does.
Table III shows the values added by the various in- 
dustries to the net value of commodity production. Table IV 
interprets these values in terms of percentages of total com­
modity production, One of the most striking features of the 
figures presented in Table IV is that secondary commodity 
production forms a relatively small portion of total produc­
tion t i.e. only sixty percent, What is not so readily ap­
parent is that a sizeable portion of the secondary produc­
tion figure represents manufacturing based on raw material 
processing and other industries whose main products are semi­
manufactured goods that are not meant for consumption in Ca- 
nada.
Table IV also indicates a heavy concentration in ag­
riculture, A very large portion of this figure is due to 
wheat production which is one of the largest single sources 
of farm income. Canada is the second largest world produc­
er of wheat and produces much more than the small popula-
'Table III includes only industries involved in the 
actual production of commodities. Other services such as 
those rendered by transport, communication, trade, and finan­
cial industries have been entirely excluded. This is quite 
different from the gross national product which includes all 
industries; however, the figures presented are well adapted 
for the purpose of showing how the Canadian economy utilizes 
its resources.
8*Table 3, Net Value of Products in Processing In­
dustries,11 Canada Year Book; 1952-53, p, 370*
in
ul? v m m  of f m m m t m  is gasam,m INMSTRZES, 1944-1949 
(Millions of Canadian Bollars)
ii'"im, .i.vj.',i, '.1
Industry 1944 1944 1947 1948 1949
Apiculture M3*. 1,26$ 1,468 1 , m 2,046 2,02?forestry' 50? 551 711 ■ ■954 , 1,070 1,056*fisheries 77 193 108 110 ■ 127 119Trapping 2k 22 31 17 20 ISMining ■tw 413 422 • 552 728 800*
Electric power 219 210 221 232 249 270*less duplication in 
' forestry*1* 61 65 . 7k 89 100 100
Total primary 
production 8,744 2,504 2,837 3,284 4,141 4.188
Construction 84$ 268 • #09 602 830 1,067*Custom and rep&irv 165 170 • 213 247 279 292
Manufactures k, m 3 , m 3,467 4,292 4,940 5,331*less 'duplication in 
manufactures*** : k3? 428 519 737 838 881*
Total secondary
production 4,430 4,010 4,089 5,141 6,049 6,689
Orana total 6,737 6,986 6,458 7,68? 9,351 1 9,997
*lipiuda® Se»(foafl.dlaa3..
♦♦Slimlnateeau^^ between agrlcoltmre and forestry totals*
includes sawmills, pulp end paper mills, etc., 
'fi&cb' are also included under tlie heading atom.
Sourest Oaafeda Year Book: 1952-51. f , 369.
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TABL3 XT
m m s m w s  aialysis or 5®  taltje or psoductigs, 
BY ISBOSTRIES, 1944, 1946-1949
Percentage of Total Set Production 
Industry : .   ■ .. ..
1944 1946 194? 1948 l$k9
Agriculture 22.8 22*7 19.6 21.9 20.3forestry 7.5 11.0 12.5 11.4 10.6Fisheries 1.1 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.2Trapping Q.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1
Mining 6,7 6.5 7.2 7.8 8,0Slectrie power 3.0 3.** 3.0 2.7 2.7Less duplication In 
forestry , O.f 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0
Total prinary production 40,7 44.7 42.7 44.3 41.9
Construction 3*7 6.3 7.8 8 .9 10,7Custom and repair 2.5 3.3 3*2 3.0 2 .9Manufactures 59.6 53.7 55.9 52.8 53-3less duplication in 
nauuf act ur e s '■ 6 ,5 8.0 9.6 9*0 8 .8
Total secondary
production 65.6 63.3 66.9 64.7 66.9
Grand total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Canada Year Book? 1952-53. p. J?Q.
tion of Canada can consume in any one year* the nan* ia 
true of forestry* the domestic consumption of forest pro* 
ducts is small in relation to the total amount produced, and, 
as in the case of wheat, the difference is made up by for* 
eiga sales.
The next section of the income statement deals with 
the balance of payments and is intended to show the source 
and proportion of the national income which comes from for­
eign trade.
The data shown in Table V indicate that merchandise 
exports are the largest and most important factor in the 
balance on current account,® Baring the inter-war period
Canada*s exports on current account were equal to about
10twenty-five percent of the national income. This means 
that three out of every eight persons employed in Canada find 
their occupation in the export industry. This has a very 
considerable effect on the Canadian economy, because at pre­
sent such a large portion of the economy is concerned with 
the export trade that there is little hope that with any­
thing short of an economic revolution, which would be very 
painful, of separating the volume of exports and the level of
®A1though invisible items are of some importance in 
the Canadian balance of payments, they are not crucial,
1, Jackson, "Effects of Foreign Tirade on Canadian 
and U.S. Industry," Commercial and Financial Chronicle.
CLXIII (February 21,1946), 961,
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TABUS *
BAXANG'I! Of PATM3HTS OS C0BBBUT ITEMS BST’ 
GAIfAM AHD ALL CQU5TRIBS, 1946-1951 
(Millions of Canadian Dollars)
Item 1946 194? 1948 1949 1950 1951(Prel
A. Current credits?
Merchandise exports (adjusted) 2,393 2,723 3,030 2,989 3,139 3.950Official contributions • as * • * e * •  » * 57 165Bet exports of non-aonetary gold 96 99 119 139 163 150Tourist and travel expenditures 221 251 279 286 275 271Interest and dividends 70 62 70 83 91 115freight and shipping 311 322 336 303 284 337All other current credits 2?4 289 313 277 291 353
Total current credits 3,365 3,746 4,147 4,077 4,300 5,341
B. Current debits;
Merchandise imports (adjusted) 1,822 2,535 2,598 2,696 3,129 4,103Tourist and travel expenditures 135 167 133 192 226 280Interest and dividends 312 337 325 390 474 44?freight and shipping 219 278 279 253 391 347Official contributions 9? 38 19 s e e 57 165All other current debits 417 344 341 359 442 523
Total current debits 3,002 3,699 3,695 3.890 4,629 'A'gCOw-*rv
C. Bet balance on current account * 363 + 4? + 452 + 187 - 329 - 52 4
Source; Canada Tear Bootet 1952*53 > p. 981.
national prosperity*3'1 Even if Ganadais wartime prosperity 
is projected through the postwar period anti, if domestic 
consumption is as high or higher than the prewar 1evel, the 
volume of exports will Still he a problem, because domestic 
consumption will not he high enough to absorb the maximum 
output of the present Canadian industrial and raw material 
producing plant. The effect of export volume on Canadian 
prosperity is such that in addition to the usual situation 
in which Canadian exports and national income tend to rise, 
and fall in unison with variations in prosperity there is
also a close observable relationship between exports In a
■ ■ 1 2given year and the national income in the following year*
XV. THE GAMBIA# EXPORT ECONOMY
The description above suggests that the Canadian 
economy is the 11 open" type# i.e. an important portion of 
the aggregate outlay for the purchase of the products of 
the domestic economy comes from abroad*1^ Several terms
■^K. S. Harris, “Canada's Industrial Transformation,# 
Harvard Business Review. XXII {January* 1944), 166.
12«FacRs on finds that “Taking exports from 1923 to 
1938 inclusive and comparing the® with national income from 
1924 to 1939 inclusive we find that the coefficient of cor­
relation is + .923, remarkably high," Jackson, op. cit., p, 963,
^John Archibald Stovel, “Canadian Balance of Pay­
ments” (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard Univer­
sity, Cambridge, 1949), p. 18,
might be- used to describe the particular variety of open 
economy that exists in Canada, underdeveloped* backward, and 
colonial are but a few of these terms* However, most of • 
these tbrma, are inaccurate and misleading. It is true that 
Canada still exhibits many of the conditions that are com* 
monly associated with the colonial type of economy such as 
the lack of manpower in the midst of a superabundance of 
natural resources, a lack of highly developed heavy industry, 
and a population that is dependent upon immigration, but 
they do not indicate the true nature of the economy^
Because Canada lacks population, especially as ap­
plied to agriculture and mining, there has been a rapid de­
velopment of highly mechanised methods of production in 
these industries. These are the very industries that in un­
derdeveloped of backward areas are generally carried on in a 
rather crude and inefficient manner* In Canada* on the other 
hand, the primary industries such as mining and agriculture 
are highly mechanized and form the basis for the growing 
production of highly manufactured goods. Therefore* it is 
inconsistent to call Canada underdeveloped or backward.
At present the Canadian economy is in that stage of 
its development that is midway between the colonial and in­
dustrial economies. It has moved out of the backward Stage* 
but has not yet attained the advanced stage. This is a
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stage of development that can best be described as an export 
economy* Using this term one can adequately describe the 
lack of heavy industry without failing to recognize the 
highly developed primary industries which play a part in the 
Canadian economy similar to that played by heavy industry in 
a more highly industrialized economy, and at the same time 
the young and sizeable heavy industry that is developing in 
Canada is not ignored by concentrating on just the colonial 
aspects*
A further point in favor of calling Canada an export 
economy is that Canada, speaking quantitatively, does not 
depend upon external sources for the supply of capital that 
it needs to develop its industry as does the colonial eco­
nomy of a relatively primitive agricultural or raw material 
producing nation. In the past Canada has used her capital 
imports to build up manufacturing industry, that Canada 
was successful in this, and is no longer dependent upon 
other nations for capital, is demonstrated by the fact that 
Canadian imports have shifted from finished manufactured 
goods to raw materials and semifinished manufactured 
goods,
Stovel points out one of the most basic character­
14Ibid,, p. 201.
istics of the Canadian economy when he says that ^Canadian
economic history is the story of a development based upon
one dr a few staple commodities. For such a development the
motif is inevitably great change and flux# Any innovation
affeeting the production or demand for these staples will
15have a profound effect on them*” The main staples upon 
which Canada has built her Foreign trade are newsprint and 
wheat* As McLeod indicates,the supply of these commodities 
is relatively inelastic with respect to prices and the de­
mand schedule for them tends to shift violently oyer the 
business cycle both in Canada and in the nations that regu­
larly trade with Canada#16 Thus# Canadian domestic prices 
and incomes vary significantly with the level of foreign 
trade# Consequently, the Canadian economy is especially 
vulnerable to depressions of external origin# Wallich in 
his theoretical examination ©f the export economy finds that 
*fhe most obvious feature of the export economy * . * is 
that exports and imports respectively assume the roles that, 
in an investment economy like the United States, are played 
by investment and savings#*17 The significance of this to 
Canada is that exports rather than investment become the
5Ibid.t p* 3#
16McLeod, op* ©it*, p.# 28*
17H* G* Wallich, acne.tarv Problems of an Export Eco- 
ffomy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p* 16.
main generating force in the determination of the Canadian 
national income; and consequently, imports not savings consti- 
tute the main leakage from the income stream, ft is this 
situation that accounts for the Canadian economy*®. excessive 
dependence upon.external'forces* Economically speaking,the 
export economy is at the mercy of its international custom- 
era* it can only react to international fluctuations* it 
can not originate thorn* this seemingly undesirable position 
is deceptive because the export economy does have the advan­
tage of being freed from the possibility of violent fluctua­
tions due to internal circumstances* However* even this 
relative advantage may have an ill effect because* if the 
nation is practically incapable of producing major fluctua­
tions from internal causes* it is also unable to take the 
compensating measures that are available to the investment 
economy* As has been noted* the Canadian economy cannot 
shift its productive factors away from depressed export pro­
duction to production for the home market.
the fact that the above analysis of the export econo­
my describes the Canadian situation is obvious from the ma­
terial presented in the Canadian balance sheet and income 
statement* A fact that is less obvious is that this situa­
tion of being an export economy forces the Canadian attitude 
towards foreign trade to be a liberal one. For Canada it is
not a question of whether to traUe or not*-it is a question 
of how best to trade. Towers confirms this when he says.' 
«ReeattS» .nf .'0»«waa*s relatively large stafce in foreign busi­
ness yoi’wouM expect as to he in favor of convertihility of 
currencies • unit the removal of restrict ions on international 
tradef”*9 .
€I&P$EE II
'tm cmmiM  balascb of imteemtional
PATHSSfS.' 
i * m u m m  m  fMOB
the general patters of Canadian foreign trade tip to 
World, War II was largely determined in the early years of 
the twentieth /century,.' Hucb of this basic pattern has per** 
stated in spite of the changes produced by World War II.
Ibis chapter is concerned with presenting the evolution of 
the basic pattern that exists at present*
Historically Canada*s foreign trade represents the 
'adaptation of a rapidly expanding underdeveloped economy to 
a generally favorable pattern of world trade* As a result 
of the conditions at the turn of the century, when railroad 
building was opening up the vast frontier of land, forest, 
and mineral resources to large scale exploitation, Canadian 
emphasis was placed on the production of a limited number of 
types of goods that commanded a ready world market. With 
the proceeds of her exports Canada was able to purchase a 
wide variety of goods not produced in Canada, Thus, Canada 
became, and still is, a large exporter of specialized pro­
ducts.
As previously noted, the Canadian economy is partic­
ularly wall adapted to the production of raw materials*
Early Canadian trade was dominated by the fur* fishing* and 
mining industries* but with the expansion of Industrializa- 
tion brought about by the introduction of steam power in 
1850 and electric power at the turn of the century* the na­
ture of the Canadian stock-in-trade became more diversi­
fied, Canadian export trade finally centered in processing 
raw materialsi.' For example, wood was turned into pulp and 
paper* ores were smelted and refined* and wheat was milled 
into flour* fable fl shows the value of trade over nearly 
three decades in the exports of most importance since the 
end of world War 1*
Several writers have asserted that there is a tend­
ency toward a greater percentage of manufactured goods in 
Canadian exports*1 la a sense they are correct* but one 
must realize that by manufactured exports are meant simply 
those goods* end products or otherwise* which include a high 
Canadian content of labor and capital* By using this defini­
tion the principal products in the Canadian export list can 
be considered manufactured* but the fundamental bases of the
1 Anthony ¥, G* Koo, "Studies in the Theory of Exchange 
Equilibrium,” (unpublished Sectoral dissertation* Harvard 
University, Cambridge* 1949), pp, 64-65j G* 5* Watts* "Some 
Long-term Factors in the Canadian Balance of International 
Payments*" qana^lan dpui;q,%l M  iconomlcs Political * 
Science, XVI (February, 1950)7 17.
w m M m
(Kiliioas of Canadian Dollars)
Goameiity 1920 1930 i960 1 0 ? 1951
Hewsprini 5k 133 131 j m 536
w&m% %U$ m 120 ■ 265 661
WOodputlp 41 w 61 177 365IiUmDer 75 37 68 203 312Nickel 9 21 ' 61 60 137
Altaainum 6 8 33 55 126
m m 41 30 30 - 82 117 ■Wheat flour 9k 38 26 If? 114Copper 1. 1 40 65 8?Meats $6 . 8. 63 103 72AutOfBoMles M i  pai‘ta 18 20 0 - 93 63
Source? Canadian OoverBBient, Depur tsseat 
L»*t ifsffliiwi lefereace Papers, Ho.
', p. 2; «pa € i looks
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Canadian export trad® are still the natural resources of the 
country* hot the industrial plant. In fact, one of the most 
striking characteristics of the products in the Canadian ex­
port trade is that they are virtually all the products of 
fixed and specialised resources. This fact in addition to 
the limited domestic consumption of the principal export 
goods makes the supply of these goods relatively inelastic* 
The supply cannot be altered from year to year to meet the 
vagaries of the foreign market without a serious disloca­
tion in the industry or region involved, since adaptation is 
difficult or impossible in the short run.
tforld markets for staple commodities tend to be high­
ly competitive and extremely sensitive to supply so that 
variations in price by any one producer causes an even 
greater variation in that producer*# demand curve* There­
fore, since for the most part the principal Canadian exports 
are of the type for which there is a large world market, the 
demand tends to be relatively elastic*
The Canadian concentration in a few important pro­
ducts means that Canada does not produce or produces only in 
limited quantity a large variety of other products which she 
needs. Certain commodities* such as rubber, tea, and cotton, 
are not produced because the climate of Canada is not suita­
ble to their production; others like wool, silk, china, and
i 8
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Electrical 
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Engines and boilers
Ceiton goods 
Fruite
Sugar and produsts
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U  ■ 22 31 • 106 195
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do '3? 50 *39 168
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goods, especially capital and durable consumers goods (see 
fable TO), the demand for this type of goods As especially 
sensitive to price changes since there is the tendency (as 
long as the goods are not of vital importance) to postpone 
purchases if there is a rise in price, and a tendency to 
anticipate needs whoa prices are low* the Canadian demand 
for imports is also relatively elastic in relation to the 
level of domestic income* fhe volume of,purchases of im­
ported durable consumers goods and highly manufactured 
goods for domestic consumption varies directly with the lev* 
el of income in Canada* When dealing with the vast variety 
of goods that Canada imports* it is difficult to generalize 
and make a clear statement of the elasticity of demand, but 
since the preponderance of imports (by value) are in the 
highly or semimanufactured class, the demand will tend to 
be more elastic than inelastic* the foreign supply of €a* 
nadiao imports is generally elastic,since in most cases the 
supply of highly manufactured goods is highly elastic* 
However* since not all of the goods imported into Canada are 
in the highly manufactured class, the supply is of mixed 
elasticity* Saw material imports, similar to the Canadian 
supply of this class of goods, tend to be relatively in* 
elastic*
II. THE PATTERS OP CANADIAN TRADE
36
The direction of pattern of Canadian foreign trade 
can be divided into three historic periods! pre-World war X* 
the inter-war period* and post-'tforld War II* Each of these 
periods will be treated separately in order to show the evo­
lution of the Canadian trade pattern and the origin of the 
postwar trade problems which are of vital importance in un­
derstanding Canadian exchange problems and policies.
Pre-forld war £  period. The Canadian trade pattern 
in the pre-World War I period was the result of the general 
world trade pattern that dominated the period. The princi­
pal portion of the goods in international trade flowed into 
Europe from the rest of the world, There was an equalizing 
flow of capital and services from Europe to the rest of the 
world* Great Britain was‘at the center of European trade 
matters; and therefore, as Canada came to maturity she was 
oriented to Europe, and particularly, to Great Britain,2 
This trade connection with Great Britain was beneficial to
^«The pattern of world trade in the years preceding 
world »ar I was probably of greater significance than the 
natural resources of the country in determining the degree 
to which different Canadian industries developed and the ex­
tent to which Canada became dependent on world trade for its 
livelihood,'' Canadian Government, Department of External Af­
fairs, Canada*s Foreign Trade. Reference Papers, No* 30 
(Ottawa! liepariraent of External Affairs, August, 1943), p. 3.
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Canada, because Britain provided capital to develop the Ca­
nadian economy and, in addition, provided a ready market for 
the disposal of the growing volume of Canadian production of 
basic materials* Britain also provided a large share of Ca­
nada’s merchandise imports* However, for the most part, Ca- 
nada depended upon the United State® as the supplier of the 
goods she did not produce,** It is the Canadian orientation 
toward European countries that resulted in markets for her 
exports and furnished her with capital, and the dependence 
upon the United States for imports that gave the pre-3forld 
isFar I pattern of Canadian trade its triangular appearance.
In the working of the Canadian-British-American trade 
triangle Canada used the large positive balance of sterling 
that resulted from the heavy export trade with Britain and 
other sterling nations to cover the equally large net nega­
tive balance of dollars that resulted from the import trade 
with the United States, On the other hand, the United 
States used her net positive balance of Canadian dollars 
to settle the net negative balance of sterling that resulted 
from the large interest and dividend payments on British in­
vestment in the United States* Finally, Britain completed
*1* , , , the Canadian way of life gives rise to a 
special propensity to consume Americas products**’ C* D, 
Blyth, ttSome Aspects of Canada’s International Financial 
Relations,** Canadian Journal of Economics and Political
Science* XII (August, I9^>, 306,
the triangle by using surplus American dollars to cover the
net negative balance with Canada* the consequence of the
large British imports of Canadian primary products*4
C. S* Watts has pointed out what is probably the most
important aspect of the triangle from the Canadian point Of
view* He says:
Historically the central feature of our balance of 
payments has been our dependence on developing suffi* 
cient export balances with overseas countries to settle 
our chronic large current deficit with the United 
States**the given factor in the situation* When esr* 
porting overseas we have tended to be more concerned 
with exporting for dollars than in disposing of export 
surplusesf and least of all concerned with taking pay* 
moot in goods and services from this area* In other 
words* in the first instance at least, overseas trade 
has been regarded more_as a financial cperaiieu than 
the exchange of goods*9
It appears, then* that the main reason for Canadian partici­
pation In the triangle is that Canada buys more from the 
United States than she sells there with the result that she 
must sell more to other countries and use the proceeds to
% e  cannot draw the presentation of the tripartite 
relations too strictly* because* as Angus points out*, “The 
concept of the triangle is itself open to challenge* the 
three countries are not quite so complementary nor is the 
triangle so selfcontained as is at times suggested* It is 
not by exports, visible or invisible, to the Baited States 
that Britain acquires the US dollars with which Canadians 
must in part be paid* but by exports to third countries*"
H* FV Angus, nA Review of *Borth Atlantic Triangle, the In­
terplay of Canada* the United States* and Great Britain* by 
J* Bart let Irebaer** & -
litlqal. Science. XII (Mtf 1046), 220* <•
hG* S« Matts* «Some Long-Term Factors in the Canadian
Balance of Interaational Pavmen ts t" Canadian Journal 6f Eco­
nomics and Political Science* XVl (February, 1050), 17*
settle the deficit on current account with the United States*
Free convertibility of currencies is the one condi­
tion absolutely essential to the efficient working of the 
triangular pattern of trade* Each nation must be able to 
convert freely the proceeds of its exports into the curren­
cies that it needs to settle its balance of payments; The 
rate of exchange also plays an important role in the con­
vertibility of currencies and the working of the trade tri­
angle* In order for the triangle to work, the conversions 
of currency must be made at rather stable rates with a min­
imum of loss.
In the pre-3forld War I triangular trade pattern un­
der the international gold standard* Grumb says that "While 
rates varied in response to changes in the terms of trade, 
fluctuations were held within close range of the purchas- 
ing-power-parity of dollars and pounds by their effect on 
the availability of export bills in the exchange market*”®
The inter-war period* In the inter-war period the 
pattern of Canadian trade was changed* but still retained 
its principal triangular characteristics* One of the most
6<J» A. Crumb, "Some Prospects for Free Convertibili­
ty,” Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Pacific Northwest 
Conference On Backing  ̂(Seaitiei slatel&oiieTge^ ,
ifeŜ j pi i?* •'
important changes that took place during this period was the 
emergence-of the United States as a creditor nation, The 
United States-* achievement of the position of a creditor na­
tion meant, in effect, that American industry was able to 
produce a large enough surplus on trade account to cover the 
net negative balance on capital account and add to the na­
tional holdings of foreign exchange# At the same time that 
the United States was becoming a creditor nation, Great 
Britain was losing its standing as a creditor, ituch of the 
large British investment in the United States that had been 
the basis of the prewar favorable balance on capital account 
with the United States had been liquidated during the war#' 
These changes in the balance ,of payments of the nations in 
the triangle called for a readjustment in the pattern of 
trade; Because of her creditor standing it became increas­
ingly necessary for the tfciited States to take imports in 
kind for the dividends and interest earned on her large for­
eign investment# On the other hand, it became necessary for 
Britain to bring her visible trade into equality, now that 
the rate of foreign lending and income from previous for­
eign investments had fallen off and could no longer support 
an unfavorable balance on current account# Canada stood in 
the middle of these changes#
*
As a result of the wartime expansion program Canada*s
industrial plant was more capable than ever of carrying on a 
large export trade with Great Britain and other overseas 
areas in order to' secure funds to make ef f ec tive the heavy 
Canadian demand for American imports resulting from the 
postponed- wartime expeaditures.
One of the main obstacles that Canada and the rest of 
the world encountered in the attempt to readjust their trade 
patterns to the new world situation was the strong protec* 
tionisf movement of the inter-war period, Kany of the na­
tions of the world experienced extreme difficulty in trying 
to balance their payments immediately after the war and 
'during'-'the depression that followed* _ Tariffs and other 
trade barriers were popular devices which were used to com­
bat these difficulties, these difficulties interrupted the 
free flow of goods and services and eliminated the basis of 
multilateral trade*.
Another serious obstacle to the readjustiaeat of 
trade generally| and the reestablishment of the Canadian 
trade ■triangle in particular, was the growing use of ex­
change controls:*■ ■ As noted previously* the working of the 
trade triangle is dependent upon the free convertibiii ty of 
currency at reasonably stable rates* In the inter-war pe­
riod many national including those in the triangle* found 
themselves in serious domestic financial difficulties that
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forced them to abandon the gold standard* With the passing 
of the gold standard, exchange rates became unstable and 
subject to violent fluctuations which made international 
trade a very risky business* Both protectionism and unsta­
ble exchange rates struck heavily at the Canadian attempt to 
readjust her trade,
Two possible solutions to the post-World War I prob­
lems of Canada were: (1) increasing exports to overseas and 
areas and thereby securing the funds to balance the current 
deficit with the United States, and increasing her ex­
ports to the United States to remove the deficit, However, 
conditions were such that neither of these solutions could 
be applied, Britain and the overseas area could not accept 
more Canadian exports because of their inability to finance 
an unbalanced current account, The American protectionist 
policy of the inter-war period excluded the possibility of 
increased exports to the United States, and consequently, 
the characteristic bilateral disequilibrium of the Canadian 
balance of payments was intensified. During the period 
1920-32 Canada found a temporary remedy and was able to 
achieve a balance in her International payments by off­
setting the current deficit with the Onited States by capi­
tal imports of American dollars plus current surpluses with 
countries other than Great Britain* When the depression
began in 1930, the; capital imports from the United States 
ceased and Canada, was forced to gear her economic activity 
to a low level of employment and income because of the loss 
of international ■•trade-#
The post-Mori d liar II period* the second World War 
with its immense American and overseas demand for Canadian 
products postponed the final solution of the bilateral im­
balance of the Canadian balance of payments* Curing the war 
Canadian industries were greatly expanded and the basic pat**
tern of production was somewhat modified* Before the war
/ ■■
Canadian manufacturing had been mainly concentrated in the 
primary processing of goods for export and the final proc­
essing of consumer goods for domestic consumption. A great 
part of the Canadian wartime and postwar investment was 
used to acquire facilities in the field of intermediate 
processing* fhe Canadian manufacturing industries have 
thereby become better adapted to processing goods from raw 
materials to finished productsj a development already evi-
^Stovel, speaking of the cessation of the capital in­
flow from the United States and the heavy Canadian imports 
from the United States, says, B?he construction of current 
receipts at the end of the decade of the twenties * . . was 
a shock at odds with the basic requirements of the economy, 
the absorption of which involved large scale underemploy­
ment and unemployment of capital and labor,» $. A* Stovel,
aCanadian Balance of Payments,*5 (Unpublished Sectoral Sls- 
sertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1949), p* 233*
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deuced by the marked increase in the variety of goods pro­
duced in Canada* A further result of this development is 
reflected in the increase in the finished manufactured con- 
tent of Canadian exports to overseas areas* For instance* 
Wafts points out that:
In normal times during the last generation goods so 
defined Cfully manufactured] comprised about one-fifth 
of our total exports* In the overseas countries which 
received the bulk of these exports the proportion was 
much greater* about 30 %, More recently it has been 
much higher owing to the abnormal postwar requirements 
and pressure on facilities elsewhere,8
However* this increase in the overseas export of 
Canadian fully manufactured goods does not offer a solution 
for the disequilibrium in the Canadian trade pattern. On . 
the contrary* it might even intensify the problem* because* 
as Blyth observes* wXt should be recognized that high ex­
ports, particularly escorts of manufactured goods, lead to 
larger direct imports from the tMited States because of 
their substantial dollar content**9
Another effect of the second World War was the in­
tensification of the American creditor position and the vir­
tual elimination of Britain and Western Sarppe as world 
creditors* Western luropean nations and Great Britain were 
put under a heavy pressure to bring their commodity exports
8Watts, foe, cf.it* %lyth* op. cit. , p* 310*
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and imports into closer balance as a result of their loss of 
creditor standing* a situation similar to the one this area 
experienced after the first World war* only more serious 
this time* the task of bringing exports and imports into 
balance means that exports from Great Britain and Western 
Europe must in the future be larger relative to imports than 
they were in the past. It is imperative that the absolute 
level of the foreign trade of Western European countries 
exceed prewar levels if the prewar level of standard of 
living is to be regained, or exceeded, and the burden of in­
creased national debts offset* At the same time the United 
States and Canada have increased their industrial potential 
greatly, and consequently, their ability to export has gone 
up* If both groups of countries have to increase their ex­
ports in order to maintain their standard of living and 
prosperity, then collectively they will have to increase 
their imports* For Canada the postwar situation is such
i
that in the relative, if not in the absolute sense, Western 
Europe has become a less favorable area for her to market 
her exports, but a more favorable area to obtain imports*
As a result, Canada must bring her trade with the non-Euro­
pean market into better balance, which in the last analysis, 
means she must bring trade with the United States closer to 
to equality* ?he financial difficulty Canada experienced
46
in attempting to carry out this adjustment will be reviewed
in Chapter IV*
In the postwar period the concept of the triangle has
completely changed} the arrangement of the participating
nations has been reversed* The United States now occupies
the position of the mature creditor nation similar to the
position of Great Britain before World War I* Britain has
been reduced to the standing similar to that of the United
States in the pre*frorld War I period* This position is one
which Crumb describes as follows:
The United Kingdom has reverted to the status of a 
country which must have an excess of merchandise and 
service to cover, for the time being at least, the is* 
ports of capital necessary to complete the modernization 
of her industrial plant and possibly to make up a net 
deficit on investment income account,
Canada#s position in the postwar period is similar to the 
American position following World War I. Canadian industry 
is now able to produce a surplus on trade balance and pay off 
accumulated debt on investment account. Canada is rapidly 
approaching the status of a creditor nation*
At least three problems face Canada in the postwar 
international trade. First, the pattern of trade that pre­
vailed in the years before <orld War I and persisted on an 
unstable footing during the inter-war period has been re-
10Crumb, oj>. cit., p, 18,
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lop the principal Canadian industries which required a large 
investment of capital in relation to labor* In more recent 
times the importance of foreign capital has declined, the, 
net Canadian indebtedness being $ 6,000,000,000 in 1950 as 
compared with $• 4,100,000,GOO in 1950*11 According to the 
Canada fear Book the function of foreign capital in the Ca­
nadian economy at present is a relatively minor one* The 
Year Book contends that*
Canadian capital has been the principal source of 
Canadian development in the past twenty years or more* 
Investment, which was subnormal during the 1930*s, 
showed notable expansion in certain fields during World 
War II and rose to peak levels in post-war years* Even 
in 1956 and 1951, when capital inflows were very sub** 
stantial, the portion of investment financed fey non­
resident capital was minor* In those years the net 
contrifeutlon fey nonresidents and foreign controlled 
companies to the savings used for all types of invest­
ment in Canada was only about one-seventh of the to- 
lai.12
Beside the changes in the absolute amount and rela­
tive importance of foreign investment in Canada there have 
also been significant changes in the origin and composition 
of the investment* the relative importance of British and 
American investment In Canada has changed greatly in recent
^ffewever, 1950 represents a year of rapid capital 
inflow* The low point in the Canadian negative balance of 
indebtedness was 1949, when the total was $ 3,730,000,000. 
Canada Year Book* 1952—53* p* 10S6.
' p-
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decades (see fable IX), In the pre-World War I period Brit** , 
ish investment constituted the largest portion of external 
capital invested in Canada, However, during and after World 
War I American investment in Canada increased rapidly and in 
1926, just before the decrease of the total foreign invest­
ment in Canada during the 1930%, the American investment in 
Canada was $ 3,196,000,000 as compared with the British in** 
vestment of $ 2,636,000,000, During World War II American 
investment reached a record peak, but during the same peri** 
od British investment decreased as a result of the Canadian 
reparation of securities* Consequently, the total amount 
of foreign capital invested in Canada did not increase 
during World War II.
Substantial increases in American investment ip Ca­
nada occurred during the postwar period* the largest of 
these increases took place in the years following 1948, par** 
ticularly in 1950 and 1951* fhe increase in American in­
vestment from 1946 to 1951 amounted to about $ 2,250,000,000. 
Throughout the period reinvestment of earnings accounted for 
more than one half of the increase* The greatest actual in­
flow of capital occurred during 1950-51* Two reasons have 
been advanced for this inflow* One, according to Jr., ¥, 
popkin, is that the strong Canadian dollar position in 1952 
* * . * reflects our current attraction for foreign capital
m m  it
m m t m  sapi§ai, iffssfis -nr ganada, 
i f  vma o r iintes*§«sa& ■
(Millions of Canadian Dellars)
fype. of Investment 1933 1939 1946 1948 1949 1950
Government securities 
federal Provincial' 
Municipal
751.9 823.0 
571*7 536.0 394.4 344.0
750.0
594.0
267.0
823.0
528.0 
248*0
975.0
534.0246.0
1,141,0
565.0
256.0
fotal Government 
■securities lf? l M  1.703.0 1,611,0 1,599.0 1.755*0 1,962.0
Public utilities 
Bailways 
Others 2,224.7 1,870.8 625.4 54f.4
1,583.0
557,0
1,504.0
468,0
1,445.0
494.0
1,456*0543.0
fotal public utilities 2,870.1 2,420.0 2,140.0 1,972.0 1,939*0 1,999.0
Manufacturing 
■lining and smelting 
Merchandising 
Financial iasti tatioas 
■Other enterprises'' 
Wioeelianeous assets
1,421.6 1,445.2
338.5 .. 329.1
191.5 I89.3  
4?9*6 472.7
75.2 69.0
270.O 285.0
1,895.0
386.0
238.0
557.0 
69.0
282.0
2,317.0
424.0
262.0
541.0 
78.0
298.0
2,539.0
494.0
279.0
548.0 
83.0
302.0
2,763*0628.0
310.0
566.0  
98.0
320.0
fotal foreign ‘ 
investments'. 7,364.5 6*913*3 7,178.0 .7,491.0 7,939.0 8,646,0
British*
United States1** 
Other countries
2,682.8 2,475,9 
4,491.7 4,151.4 
190.0 286.0
1,668,0
5.157.0353.0
1.593.0
5.566.0 
332.0
1.694.0
5.905.0 
340.0
1,723*0
6,565.0358.0
•includes some investments held in the U.K. for residente of other 
countries.
** Includes some lavestments held la the U.S. for residents of other 
eeuntries.
Seurse: Canada Year look: p. IO89.
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because of our attractive opportunities for investment* a 
conservative fiscal policy* and favorable tax policies**13 
A more plausible explanation is offered by W, C. Clark* who 
says that?
During the spring and summer of 1950* as our econom­
ic situation improved* a large and increasing number of 
people* both inside and outside of Canada, came to the 
conclusion that the Canadian dollar was undervalued at 
the chosen official rates and, therefore* on top of a 
large inflow of investment capital interested in the 
development of our oil and other natural resources* we 
had an avalanche of speculative capital lured by the 
almost *sure bet* of an upward revaluation of our del* lar*P .
These reasons are cited in order to distinguish the 1950-51 
inflow of capital from the inflow of American capital that 
took place in 1920*s. the principal difference between the 
two is that the 1920 movement fa large part of which was 
short term) was induced balance of payments borrowing which 
is an indication of an underlying disequilibrium in the 
balance of payments, The 1950-51 movement was more in the 
nature of an autonomous movement of speculative and long­
term investment funds, which were not connected with a fun­
damental disequilibrium in the balance of payments* This
V j . W, Popkin, “Canada and Cur Cold Buying Policy,* 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle* CIXXVII (January,15.TWWT̂ If. :i",r "Ili:' n:,'mrrm"i:'r,i':r''.*
'•1% .  C» - Cl ark. Canada^s Past~#ar Finance, Statements 
and Speeches so, 52/59,'(Wtawa: Department of External 
Affairs* December 29* 1952)* p. 13.
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distinction will be of considerable importance in the later 
evaluation of Canada1s postwar exchange difficulties and the 
methods used to overcome them#
Canada*$ foreign assets# the amount and composition 
of Canada*5 foreign assets has changed greatly in recent 
years (see fable X). In the period from 1930 to 1950 the 
total value of Canadians foreign assets* including gold and 
liquid reserves in foreign currency* rose from $ 1*867*000*000 
to $ 5*454>000,000# The greatest part of this increase was 
the result of the Federal Government's extension of loans 
and export credits to the United Kingdom and other overseas 
countries,*15 At present the largest portion of Canadian 
foreign assets are officially owned. Since the end of World 
War II privately owned foreign assets have constituted only 
a minor portion of the total Canadian holdings of foreign 
assets* The total privately owned portfolio investment 
abroad has declined since 1939 due to the liquidation of the 
Canadian holdings of American securities (see Table XI).16
15The reasons for these loans and their effect on the 
Canadian balance of payments are discussed in Chapter I?. .
16Blyth contends that! "The financial effect of the 
war years has been a sharp increase in American investment 
in Canada and a decrease in Canadian long-term investment in 
the United States accompanied by a substantial increase In 
Gan&da*s liquid assets in the United States*" filyth* op. 
eit*. p* 304.
f&MM X
CHANGES IS flX GOMPOSItlOS GP GAN&BIAN 
FOREIGN INVESfMISfS, 19% X ®  1950 
(Milliene of Canadian Bo liar 8)
location of Bireet Portfolio Investments fatal
Investments Investments Stocks Bonds fetal Investments
19% 1950 19% 1950 19% 1950 19% 1950 19% 1950
Baited States m 760 260 298 83 91 343 389 829 1,1%
Bai ted Kingdom do 64 2-5 19 26 18 51 37 111 101
Other Commonwealth 
countries 64 86 7 6 11 8 IS 14 82 100
Other foreign 
Countries 162 80 106 125 33 33 139 158 301 238
fotal m 990 398 448 153 150 551 59® 1,323 1,588
HGfS; Excludes investments of insurance companies, Government credits, 
and liquid reserves. Holdings of stocks are at Book -mines as shown on the 
hooks of the issuing company; holdings of hands are shown at par value* for­
eign currency is converted into Canadian dollars at current market rate.
. Souree: Canada fear Book: 19%-%, p. 11#; and Canada fear Book: 
p, 1091.
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TABLE XI
CANADIAN FOREIGN ASSSTS 
(Millions of Canadian Dollars)
Assets 1930 1939 1946 1948 1949 1950
Direct investment in 
business outside Canada 443 671 772 788 904 990
Portfolio holdings of 
foreign securities 842 719 551 605 638 598
Government credits 31 31 1.362 1,8?8 2,000 1.990
Official balances of 
gold held abroad 180 m 1,251 1,006 1,232 1,876
Total Canadian assets 
abroad 1,496 1,8?6 3,936 4,277 4,774 5.454
MOTE: Excludes investment of insurance companies*
Source; Canada Year Book; 1950. p. 394; and Canada Year Book: 
1952*51. a. 1090.
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Canada*s ability to export capital. Canada*s claim 
to the title of creditor nation is not a clear one. Canada 
is stiil a debtor nation in the sense that there is more 
foreign capital in Canada ($ 8,646,900,000 in 1950) than 
Canadians have invested abroad ($ 5*454,000,000). However, 
Canada is a creditor nation in the sense that in every year 
since 1934 Canada has had a net credit in her favor on the 
balance of International payments* the deciding question 
in estimating Caaada*s international financial position is 
the nation*# ability to export capital. Blytfe expresses
one opinion on the matter. He contends thati%
. , *"it will not be long before Canada is in fact 
a creditor nation in so far as its financial relations 
with the overseas world at large is concerned, the 
existence, however, of a sobstantial balance of indebt­
edness to the United States will, for a long time at 
least, more than offset Canada1# creditor position with 
the rest of the world* 17
Another view is that the great increase in officially owned
forjeign assets constitotes evidence that * , . * Canada will 
be able to continue the prewar pattern of reducing her in** 
ternational indebtedness and undertaking some new investment 
abroad*a*18 the Volume of evidence, however, seems to indi-*
l% > l d *» p* 395*
^Canadian Government, Departmentof External Affairs, 
Canada1# Foreign trade. Reference Papers, No. 30 (Ottawa! 
department of External Affairs, August, 1943), p. 9,
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cate a compromise as being correct. Clark’s contention is 
the basis of this opinion, he says:
Since the end of the war, if we take into account 
what we have lent or invested abroad, we have provided 
enough out of our own savings to finance the whole of 
our development program. It is true that in 1950 and 
1951 Canadian savings equaled only 90 % of the total, 
but for the period 1946 to 1951 we have a net investment 
abroad of $ 78 million and that the net result is not 
likely to have been effected very much either way by 
developments during 1952.19
Therefore, the Canadian economy is capable of supplying it­
self with all the necessary funds to carry on an extremely 
large scale program of internal development, and is in a 
sense self-supplied with respect to capital. This type of 
self-sufficiency with respect to capital is quite different, 
however, from a net creditor position. That Canada is not a 
mature creditor nation, such as the United States is or 
Great Britain was, is indicated by the fact that Canada 
could not maintain her official program of export credits 
and loans to overseas nations, at the same time that she was 
experiencing an internal expansion, without an inflow of 
funds from the United S t a t e s T o  sum up, the Canadian
19Clark, op. cit., p. 4,
20f,The greater portion of the funds for development 
are being provided internally, but the present rate would be 
impossible of attainment were it not for the Influx of funds 
from the United States." H. A. Stevenson, "Canada’s Out­
standing Industrial Development.8 Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle. CLXXIV (December 13, 1951>, 2271. — «
•eeenoiay^^aiibnogb capable ol, ps*oM^iat sufficieat capital :; 
far (aao a high rate of employ*
meat).*. :la:|#;Mll::aot capable- of e^ortlog capital in large 
a^nnta'iffitfeoat ;obiapeiisatliî  inflowsof .foreign capital.
grapter i n
FOREIGN EXCHANGE THEORY
The purpose of this chapter is to present the fraise* 
work of the theory of exchange rate determination within 
which the particular Canadian exchange problems can be ex­
plored.
The task of constructing such a theoretical frame­
work is complicated by the fact that there are numerous and 
diverse theories of exchange rate determination. This com­
plication dates from the general abadonment of the inter­
national gold standard during the 1930%  and is rooted in 
the resultant controversy over fixed versus variable ex# 
change rates. Economists have advanced a welter of theo­
ries either defending or attacking the ideas of fixed or 
variable exchanges*, but in more recent times the controversy 
has been settled* as Young contends* in favor of fixed rates 
with infrequent adjustment,1 At present it seems that ex­
change rates* whether directly controlled or not, have be­
come a matter of official decision, rather than the result 
of the operation of free market forces4 This settling of 
the controversy does not, however, solve the problem of
^dohn Parke Young* ^Exchange Rate Determination,H 
American Economic Review* XXXVII (September* 1947), 589*
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constructing a framework of exchange rate theory.^ fhe ob­
ject of this chapter is to present the forces at work in the 
determination of an equilibrium rate of exchange under any 
condition, controlled or not. Under a system of exchange 
control, or one of the numerous other devices used to fix 
the rate, equilibrium can be forced at almost any rate of 
exchange, but even under these conditions the rate must 
reflect the market demand and supply of foreign exchange as 
they finally appear to the buyers and sellers in the market* 
It is for this reason that we must first apply ourselves to 
presenting the fundamental market forces in exchange rate 
determination before we are able to go on and examine the 
situation in the controlled or restricted exchange market. 
Just as in value theory, where one constructs a model of 
perfect competition before considering imperfect competition 
and monopoly conditions, so in the case of exchange rate 
theory it is best to analyse the free market before ap­
proaching the controlled market.
^Despite the settling of the question of fixed versus 
variable rates, the controversy between the purchasing- 
power-parity anti the balance of payments approach. to the 
determination of exchange rate rages unchecked. The latter 
approach is used as the basis of the exchange rate theory 
presented here.
I. ;fim GMERAL THEORY Of FQREIGH EXGHARGB
The rate of foreign exchange is in reality a- price, 
Since the rate is nothing wore than an expression of the’ 
vaiwe of n particular national isonetary aaif in terms of the 
monetary another country t -or in'other words*-it is
the price of one monetary unit in terms of another* When 
the ■rate-., of exchange is viewed as a price, the problem of ' 
constructing a theory of 'exchanges is simplified; and’ re*' 
solved into an exercise of applying the -analytical tools 
developed in modern value and price theory* Harsh contends 
that tfffee peeuiarities of the foreign exchange market are 
institutional and a separate theory of foreign exchanges 
is redundant and futile* ,t3
to analysing exchange rate determination, it is aec* 
essary to realise that the establishing of an equilibrium 
rate of exchange under free market conditions is-# la reality, 
only a part of the larger movement of the balance of pay­
ments toward equilibrium and the adjustment of the domestic 
economy to external conditions* Harsh says that:
the balancing effect of transactions in the foreign 
exchange market is * * * a part of a larger'-process,
■%0iiald Bailey/Harsh, World■ Trade and Investment (lew 
York: Hareourt, Brace and Company,!§51), p* 176.
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the allocation of resources among alternative uses* And 
at the,same time, if the level of activity is not given 
{as indeed it never is given in the real world), the 
foreign exchange market impinges also on the expansion 
(or contraction) effect of the trade balance upon the 
level of exports and imports, home consumption, invest* 
ment, national income, and the volume of employment,4
It is apparent, therefore, that an analysis of foreign ex­
change determination is.an integral part of the theory of 
international trade*
fhe determination of the exchange rate is inextricab­
ly boundi up with equilibrating of the balance of interna­
tional payments, which is an accounting of the exchanges 
made between one country and the rest of the world* One of 
the basic factors in the balance of payments is the unit of 
account {national currency) in terms of which the balance is 
expressed* Consequently, if the balance of payments is to 
be in equilibrium, the unit of account must also be in 
equilibrium* A balance of payments equilibrium for the 
world as a whole presupposes the stability of the various 
monetary units in terms of each other* $o, as JEarsh points 
out, * * * « the process of achieving equilibrium is in 
part an adjustment of the values of these monetary units*”** 
It is most convenient to distinguish only two major 
subdivisions in the balance of payments! (1) the balance of
4Ibid*;* p. 191;* 5Ibid** pp* 174-76*
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trade which represents the income account and deals with 
payments in connection with exports and imports* and (2) the 
balance of lending which represents the capital account and 
deals with the payments in connection with short* and long* 
term borrowing and lending* Since for any given period the 
balance of payments as a whole must balance* it follows that 
payments in respect to the balance of lending must be equal 
and opposite to payments in respect to the balance of trade* 
All balance of payments items on one side of the account are 
immediately offset by items on the other side of the balance. 
This is merely the international counterpart of the account 
used in recording foreign transactions in the computation of 
the national product and national income*
Joan Robinson* in her explanation of the equating of 
the balance of payments accounts* points out that it merely 
means that when over any period of time a nation has a sur* 
plus of receipts from exports over payments for imports it 
must* at the same time* be lending (in the broad sense) an 
equal sum to the foreign country*6 Similarly, in the case 
of a surplus of imports* there must be an equal amount of 
borrowing* However* the mere fact that there must be an
6Joan Robinson, ®The Foreign Exchanges** Readings in 
the Theory of International Trade * Series of Republished 
Articles on Economics* American Economic Association (Phil­
adelphia: The Blakiston Press* 1949)* pp. 65*86*
equality does not explain by what process it is brought 
about.
The determinants of the level of the balance of trade 
(the volume Of exports and imports) are numerous and com* 
pi ex. Tastes, techniques, the resources of the nations of 
the world, and costs and incomes at home and abroad are the 
mos t impor tan t' imaedia to de termiaaats. Cos ts and inc omes , 
however, are in turn dependent upon the level of money 
wages, and effective demand. In the case of the balance of 
lending the principal determinants (given wealth and in* 
comes) are the relative rates of interest at home and 
abroad, and all the numerous factors that can be called 
"the state of confidence". These diverse forces only deter­
mine what the balance of lending and the balance of trade 
are to be; equality between the two accounts is brought 
about through the operation of supply and demand, as ex­
pressed in the exchange rate, Pollowing a similar line of 
reasoning Robinson comes to the conclusion that; "The theo* 
ry of exchanges may be regarded as the analysis of the man* 
ner in which movements of the balance of lending and balance 
of trade are equated to each other*®7 In mahing this point 
Robinson is. admittedly expanding upon the suggestion made by
7Robinson, Ibid., p. 87,
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Keynes in his Treatise on Honey. It is Keynes' fundamental 
proposition that equilibrium in an international currency 
requires that each country have an equality between its rate 
of foreign lending and its balance of trade. Keynes elabo­
rates on this and states the central part of his thesis in 
the contention that: MHow this involves two sets of condi­
tions. For the rate of foreign leading depends upon rela­
tive interest rates at home and abroad: whilst the foreign 
balance depends upon relative price levels at home and 
abroad,”8 These factors which Keynes stated and Robinson 
elaborated upon are nothing more than the institutional 
factors which Marsh alluded to as being peculiar to the 
problem of exchange rate theory,®
Having shown the subsidiary character of the exchange 
rate in connection with the balance of payments, the next 
step is to examine the actual determination of the exchange 
rate. This is accomplished by describing the exchange mar­
ket, the transactions that take place in the market, the 
parties to the transaction, the composition of supply and 
demand, and finally, the determinants both general (insti­
tutional) and specific of the supply and demand for foreign
8John Maynard Keynes, 4  Treatise on Money (Hew York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930”$", Vol. I, p. 327.
9See p. 60.
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exchange.
In essence, the market is a series of transactions in 
which commodities are bought and sold at prices which under 
the conditions of the market are acceptable to buyers and 
sellers. To be more specific, the foreign exchange market 
is a series of transactions in which an exchange of monetary 
units is made* ¥hat is actually taking place is the trans­
fer of the purchasing power which the monetary unit repre­
sents, but just as the abstract concept of purchasing power 
must be made more specific by reference to the standard 
unit of account, likewise must the abstract concept of the 
unit of account be solidified into a more concrete form. 
Consequently, although the transactions in the national and 
international exchange markets really represent transfers 
of purchasing power in the forms of abstract units of account, 
the more conventional forms of concrete "means of payments” 
are used in order that human beings may observe and manipu­
late the proceedings,
Tt seems best; following Machiup*s example, for the 
sake of simplicity to combine the spot and forward exchange 
markets with the foreign exchange market at a domestic place 
and the foreign exchange market at a foreign place into one 
perfect market.*0 The advantage of this simplification is
*°Fritz Mac hi up, "The Theory of Foreign Exchanges," Read-
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that, when speaking of one market, it is possible to treat 
one currency as the “commodity” and the other currency as 
money*
One of the main prerequisites for any market are 
buyers and sellers* In the case of the foreign exchange 
market the buyers and sellers are private persons, profes­
sional traders, and the government* These groups constitute 
the parties to the transactions in the exchange market. De- 
manders of foreign currency may be further divided into four 
main groups: (1) dealers who wish to pay for goods purchased 
from foreigners, (2) financiers who make loans or purchase 
foreign securities, (3) speculators who try to profit from 
fluctuations in the exchange rates, and (4) those who trans­
fer funds from a country of less to one of greater economic
1 1and financial stability.
A nation’s actual supply of foreign exchange is made 
up of its holdings of the transfer medium in which the ex­
change market deals* Holdings of foreign exchange are al-
iMS. 4a 3Jl« plfMZ g£> teforna,tl.qna.l, & & & ,  Series of Sepub- 
lishedArtides on Economics, American Economic Association 
(Philadelphia: The Blakiston Press, 1949), p. 105.
■^A fifth group could be cited representing the offi­
cial dealings of the government when it is interested in 
establishing a certain rate of exchange, but since the pur­
pose here is to describe the determination of the rate in 
the absence of governmental interference, we shall disregard 
the last classification.
ways holdings of short-term evidences of debt against a 
foreign coon try or its residents* Actiiai carrenoy and 
foreign bank balances are the most liquid forms and* there1* 
fore, make tip the primary source of supply. There Is* how* 
ever* a secondary reserve of prime liquidity, viz* the 
stocks of monetary gold held by the nation in depositories 
at home and abroad* Short-term obligations in foreign ex­
change at call or with maturities ranging from thirty to. 
ninety days make up a less liquid reserve supply of ex* 
change* There is also a contingent reserve made up of the 
holdings of long-term foreign securities and such assets as 
real property that may in time of need be converted*
In computing the actual demand for foreign exchange 
a nation must take into account the reserves of its home 
currency held by other nations.* the balance of these re­
serves may be favorable or unfavorable, that is either a net 
asset or a net liability depending upon the relative size 
of claims by foreigners on the country in question* The 
balance that la struck between the two reserves is called 
the balance of international indebtedness* This balance is 
further broken down into short- and long-ter® categories 
based on the degree of liquidity of the claims* .Within this 
subdivision it is possible for a nation to be a net creditor 
on long-term and at the same time a debtor on short-term*
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Such a condition might ho necessary to balance a large cur­
rent deficit on trade account* In fact, one of the princi­
pal determinants of the balance of indebtedness is ’the bal­
ance of trade* In the yearly accounting of the national in­
come the net gain or loss in the trade of goods and services 
is posted to the balance of international indebtedness* In 
other words, the day to day changes in the balance of pay­
ments on income account are the main source of change in the 
balance of indebtedness.
Although of considerable importance, the effect of 
the balance of indebtedness on the exchange rate is not nec­
essarily direct* It is possible for the balance, of indebt­
edness to be running against a country, and yet there would 
not be any pressure on the external value of the nation’s 
currency* However, we can not discount the important fact 
that the balance of indebtedness constitutes a contingent or 
delayed demand on a nation’s exchange resources which, when 
it materi^ii^bS, will take the immediate form of a claim on 
the debtor nation’s reserves of foreign exchange* there are 
various ways in which this claim can be met* One of the 
most common ways is for the debtor nation to have achieved 
a positive balance on income account before the claim ma­
tures, and thus pay off its debt with its increased exports* 
This is just another way of saying that the reserves of for-
eign (exchange are replenished as fast as they are drained 
away in debt payments* Another ,method is for the debtor ha*, 
tion to Mtadt. imports from the creditor nation at the time 
the debt matures, and thus he able to pay off the debt with 
the existing exports* Bat no matter What method is used to 
meet the maturing obligation, the important point is that 
the, funding of income account deficits through foreign her* 
rowing only postpones a required adjustment in the balance 
of payments* When the day of reckoning finally arrives, and 
the adjustment cannot be postponed any longer, it may re­
quire a drastic adjustment in the foreign exchange market in 
order that the fundamental conditions of the international 
equilibrium can be met* Therefore, even.though not ex* 
pressed immediately, the balance of international indebt* 
edness still constitutes an important part of the demand for 
foreign exchange*
In summing up the total supply and demand for foreign 
exchange* Harsh says*
At any given time the demand and supply of foreign 
exchange in. the aggregate appear respectively as the 
debit and credit side of the balance of payments? and 
the demand and supply for the currency of any specific 
country appears as the debit, and credit side of the 
balance of payments with that country*12
This does not mean that every item in the balance of pay*
12Hafsh, 0£. cit*, p*
ments must give rise to An actual transfer of payments 
through the exchange market*'- If is a truism that all balance 
of payments items are immediately offset by items on the op­
posite side of the balance* but in some cases the offsetting 
item may not be an increase or decrease in the nationts bal­
ances of liquid foreign exchange* However* even in those 
cases, where there is not an immediate effect on the balance 
of exchange holdings, there still must be at least an effect 
on the balance of indebtedness which, as shown above* is a 
contingent factor in the determination of the exchange 
rate ,13 An example will clarify this statement: If a cor­
poration owning a foreign subsidiary affects a transfer of 
goods or evidence of debt by a simple process of inter* or 
intra*corporaiion bookkeeping, there is at least an effect 
on the balance of international indebtedness, if not on the 
immediate reserves of foreign exchange, because it involves 
the extension of credit by the parent company or its subsid­
iary, Even when there is a barter deal In goods or serv-
i$fhere is at present considerable controversy over 
the role of the balance of payments in exchange rate deter* 
mi nation* Ifaehltip takes an opposite view to the one ex­
pressed above by Marsh, and says: "One of the most naive 
misunderstandings in the theory of foreign exchanges is the 
Idea that the balance of international payments shows the 
supply and demand for foreign exchange and can explain the 
movements of.the foreign exchange rates observed in the 
market,* Maehlup, op, oft,» p, 1ST,
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ices* there is credit created, aithough the.dehit and credit 
items on the balance of payments immediately offset each 
other* therefore., all transactions- in goods and services 
and debt that appear in the balance of payments are posted 
to the balance of trade or the balance of indebtedness*’ ‘ 
thereby becoming parts of the aggregate supply and demand 
for foreign exchange.
Briefly stated,'the exchange rate is the result of 
the interaction of supply and demand* However, to be mean- 
ingful this statement must be expanded? it must go “beyond 
supply and demand*w Ibis is in keeping with conventional 
value theory * which takes into account all the forces that 
constitute the supply and demand and determine what a par­
ticular price at a particular place will be*
It can be said that in any free market the market 
supply and demand will be brought to a formal equality over 
a period of time, but at the same time they need not, and 
often are not* in equilibrium* in equilibrium nr?ce is 
that price in any market that is consistent no only with 
the equation of supply and demand, but is also consistent 
with a state of equilibrium between the two, such that any 
change in price will tend to be corrected by the interaction 
of supply and demand in such a way that there will be a re­
turn to the former price, in the following analysis an at-
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tempt is made to discover not only by what forces the market 
for foreign exchange is brought to equality, but also in 
what way an equilibrium price is established,
Equality in the balance of payments is the result of 
adjustments in the volume and value of the sales and pur­
chases appearing on either side of the accounts. These ad­
justments are in turn brought about by a complex adjustment 
of incomes and prices, which affect the whole range of a 
natIon*s economic activity, Marsh contends that:
In international economics the dynamics of the trade 
balance depends upon habits and tastes with respect to 
exporting, importing, and investment abroad; and given 
these, equilibrium is brought about by an adjustment in 
the volume of trade itself and of its money value,14
It appears then that equality in the exchange market, like 
equality in any market, is brought about by the changes in 
purchases caused by changes in incomes and prices, and that 
in addition to the mere balancing of exports and imports, 
the exchange rate is brought into equilibrium over time by 
adjustments in the national level of economic activity and 
the allocation of resources.
In the operational sense the exchange rate is the in­
termediary by which changes in the balance of payments (dis­
regarding for the moment how these changes come about) are
14Marsh, oj>. cit., p. 197,
affected* In causal terms the exchange rate is both a cause 
and an effect* First, since the balance of payments repre­
sents the aggregate supply and demand for foreign exchange,, 
it follows that the balance Of payments must be the origin 
of any change in the exchange rate* In this sense the ex* 
change rate is an effect* Second* changes in the exchange 
rate cause an adjustment of prices and incomes and have con* 
sequent secondary effect upon the level of economic activity 
and the allocation of resources which brings about a change 
in the balance of payments* thus, the exchange rate is also 
a cause of changes in the balance of payments*1® fhe net 
result of this chain of causations is an adjustment of .the 
total balance of payments to the situation set up by the 
original autonomous change in one part of the balance of 
payments* the autonomous change itself originates in the 
complex of factors and forces which determine the level of 
the balance of payments* Marsh sums up the functioning of 
the exchange rate as; «$he balancing effect of transactions 
in the foreign exchange market is* therefore* part of a
^Anthony ¥* €U $:oo, "Exchange Equilibrium" (unpub­
lished Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, 
1949), pp* 64-6§* Koo says on. this point thats "It is often 
overlooked by many that the state of balance of payments is 
not Only the cause but also the result of the rate of ex­
change. While the rate established at any moment on the 
market is the result of the position of the balance of pay* 
meiits--that position was in turn conditioned by the rate of 
exchange in the last period*»
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large process, the allocation of resources among alternative 
uses,11̂ ®
An example of the functioning of the exchange rate 
will clarify the relationships presented above* Assume that 
after a certain exchange rate has keen in force for some 
time the amount which the inhabitants of the country desire 
to lend abroad increases. As a result the demand for foreign 
currency at the ruling rate increases and exceeds the sup- 
ply. Consequently, the exchange rate falls, i.e. it now re­
quires more domestic currency to buy the same amount of for­
eign currency, thus, the change in the balance of lending 
has led to a change in the exchange rate* However, the fall 
in the exchange rate has the effect of making domestically 
produced goods appear cheaper to foreigners, thus leading to 
an increase in the volume of exports. If the volume of ex­
ports increases, the domestic price of exports cannot fall, 
therefore, the value of exports, in terms of home currency, 
increases* In the case of imports the fall in the exchange 
rate has the effect of making foreign goods more expensive 
in the home market. There is the possibility that even 
though the physical volume of imports purchased out of a 
given income declines, the total expenditure may increase
^Marsh, ©g* cit., p, 101*
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provided more home income is spent on imported goods* If 
imports increase as rapidly as exports, then the original 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments caused by increased 
foreign lending will be maintained by the fall in the rate 
of exchange*
According to the theory that the exchange rate is the 
equilibrating factor in the balance of payments, a rise in 
the volume of lending should have the effect of bringing 
about an increase in the balance of trade* But.if, as it 
appears in the example cited above, a decline in the ex­
change rate will not necessarily cause an increase in the 
balance of trade, the exchange rate has not acted as the 
equilibrating factor and our assumption of the function and 
determination of the exchange rate is incorrect, the re­
sult of a change in the balance of payments on the exchange 
rate is quite clear; the important question concerns the re­
action of the balance of payments to a change in the ex­
change rate. If as a result of the fall in the exchange 
rate the value of imports (reckoned in domestic currency) 
increases by more than the value of exports, then a fall in 
the exchange rate will reduce the balance of trade. And if, 
as in our example, the balance of lending were increasing at 
the same time, there would result an inequality in the bal­
ance of payments as a consequence of the change in the ex-
change rate. Thus, the example cited above does more than 
just point up the causal relationships between the balance 
of payments and the exchange rate? it indicates the factors 
that must be known in judging the closeness of the relation­
ship* namely* the elasticities of supply and demand.1^
There are four elasticities involved in computing the
v '.
effect upon the balance of trade of a change in the exchange 
rate. They ares (1) the foreign elasticity of demand for 
exports, (2) the domestic elasticity of the supply of ex­
ports (which is influenced by the elasticity of home demand 
for exportable goods), (3) the foreign elasticity of supply 
of imports* and (4) the home elasticity of demand for im­
ports (which is influenced by the domestic elasticity of 
supply of rival commodities).
On the export side of the balance sheet Robinson has 
found that "The minimum effect of a fall in, the exchange 
rate upon the value of exports is produced when the foreign 
demand has zero elasticity,"18 In this case there is no 
increase in exports. The maximum effect is produced when a 
perfectly elastic foreign demand is combined with a perfect-
i^Machlup says, "The study of the elasticities of de­
mand and supply is* thus, the core of the theory of foreign 
exchange rates. Mac hi up, op. cit., p. Ill*
1%Obinson* op. cit,« pp. 90-91>
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ly elastic domestic supply of exports. In this case the in­
crease in the value of exports is infinitely great.
On the import side of the balance of trade the maxi­
mum effect of a reduction in the rate of exchange on the 
value of imports will occur when domestic demand is perfect­
ly inelastic. The minimum effect will occur when a per­
fectly elastic foreign supply is combined with a perfectly 
elastic home demand. In this case imports are reduced to 
zero*
The general conclusion that can be drawn from this 
analysis is that, as long as home demand for imports is 
greater than unitary elasticity, a decline in the exchange 
rate will result in an increase in the balance of trade.
This is true, because as the value of imports falls, the 
value of exports at least remains the same or rises. How­
ever, even if the demand for imports is less than unity, 
the balance of trade will still increase as long as there 
is a sufficient increase in the value of exports. The in­
crease in the value of exports is dependent upon the elas­
ticity of foreign demand being great enough to compensate 
for the low elasticity of home demand. If this were not the 
case, the balance of trade would decline when the domestic
19Ibid.t p. 91.
demand for imports was less than unitary elasticity* It is 
apparent then that as Robinson says,* * . * the balance of 
trade may increase with a fall in the exchange rate even if 
the elasticities of foreign and home demand are both less 
than unity*”20 However, the domestic demand must be suffi- 
cient to compensate for the low elasticity of foreign demand 
in such a case*
It appears that given an initial change in the balance 
of lending, which at the existing exchange rate causes the 
balance of trade to fall short of the balance of lending, 
there will be a tendency for the exchange rate to depreci­
ate* Under conditions, where there is a perfectly elastic 
foreign demand and a perfectly elastic domestic supply of 
exportable goods, the equation of the balance of lending 
with the balance of trade is restored by the increase in the 
balance of trade and further depreciation of the exchange 
rate is prevented*21 therefore, our assumption about the 
equalizing effect of the exchange rate has been affirmed#22
20Ibid., p* 92.
2iRobinson finds that these are the conditions that 
exist between Countries on the gold standard* Ibid* * p* S3*
22The conclusion holds true for free exchangesas well 
as the gold standard, because as Robinson points out *The 
only difference between the two is that under the gold 
standard the authorities are committed to one particular ex-
In the analysis thus far only a change in the balance, 
of lending, which brings about a change in the balance of 
payments through a change in the exchange rate, has been 
considered* This, however, is only one side of the balance 
of payments*^ Consideration is now given to the effect 
that a change in the balance of trade will have upon the ex­
change rate and how equality in the balance of payments as a 
whole is achieved after the initial change*
When viewing it from the standpoint of the effect 
upon the exchange rate, an autonomous change in the balance 
of trade is quite different from a change in the balance of 
lending, because the change in the balance of trade produces 
a direct effect on the balance of lending, the question of 
whether a change in the balance of trade will have any effect 
on the rate of exchange depends upon the domestic rate of
change rate so that the equilibrium of the balance of pay­
ments must be preserved in face of changing conditions 
entirely by inducing changes in the level of incomes, and 
not at all by allowing variations in the exchange rate, 
while under free exchanges the authorities have some lati­
tude in their choice between the two methods of adjustment*” 
Ibid,, p.* 103.
23There are some grounds for saying that it is the 
least important side of the balance of payments as far as 
the determination of the exchange rate is concerned** ’ Keynes 
says, ”Historically, the volume of foreign investment has 
tended, I think, to adjust itself— at least to a certain 
extent— to the balance of trade, rather than the other way 
around, the former being sensitive and the latter insensi­
tive. ° dohn Haynard Keynes, ”The German Transfer Problem,” 
The Economic Journal, 1929, p. 6* (cited by goo, op. cit*, p. I'm:—
interest*
If the balance of trade increases, there will be an 
increase in the rate of foreign leading, or if the balance 
of trade decreases, there will be aa increase in the rate 
of fordign borrowing, fhis reciprocal relationship is pos­
sible without a connecting change in the rate of exchange, 
because the rate of saving in the home country exceeds or 
falls short of home investment according to whether the 
balance of trade is positive or negative* Formally* a part 
of any increase in the wealth (represented by domestic 
savings) of the inhabitants of the home country will be 
used to acquire foreign securities or make loans abroad, 
thus, an increase in the balance of trade with its concom­
itant increase in home savings results in an increase in 
foreign lending on the balance of leading* Conversely, 
when the balance of trade falls off, lending by the rest 
of the world to the home country is directly increased.
sdiether or not the direct change in the balance of 
lending is sufficient to compensate for the change in the 
balance of trade and bring the balance of payments into 
equality without a change-in the exchange rate, is depend­
ent upon the domestic rate of interest* In a theoretical­
ly perfect world capital market, in which the owners of 
wealth are indifferent between foreign or home securities,
it would be possible for the exchange rate to remain un­
changed as a result of a change in the balance of trader 
Hider such perfect conditions the world would automatical­
ly take up the excess of domestic securities over savings 
that would result from a decrease in the balance of trade 
without a change in the relative interest rates* In the 
real world, however* such a situation does not prevail* 
Generally, the home rate of interest must rise relative 
to the foreign rate if foreign purchases of domestic se­
curities are to be increased* In the event that the rate 
of interest would fail to rise as much relatively as the 
balance of trade drops, foreigners would not be induced 
to increase their holdings Of domestic securities and the 
rate of exchange would fall in order to bring the balance 
of payments to equality, the situation then that prevails 
in the real world is one in which an autonomous change in 
the balance of trade will require a change in the interest 
rate, or a change in the rate of exchange, or a change in 
both* Even if the balancing action were restricted to 
Just the home rate of interest, this in itself would not 
be a guarantee that the rate of exchange would not be ef­
fected, since there is a close relationship between the 
rate of interest and the rate of exchange* A change in 
the rate of interest could be a force making for disequi­
librium in the rate of exchange. Because, although the 
change would bring the balance of payments into equilibri­
um, it might also start a capital inflow that would put a 
strain on the exchange rate,
Before examining the relation of the interest rate 
to the rate of exchange in more detail it is helpful to 
clarify the concepts of exchange rate and balance of pay­
ments equilibrium, The general concept of an equilibrium 
price has a rather strict interpretation when applied to 
the rate of exchange, As Robinson describes it
Equilibrium with the given exchange rate is reached 
when at a constant rate of interest, the balance of 
trade, excluding gold, is brought to equality with the 
balance of nonrecurrent lending, and no transfer of 
funds or movement of gold is talcing place,24
However, it must be understood that exchange equilibrium
in the sense that no transfer borrowing or gold movement
is taking place is quite different from the concept of full
balance of payments equilibrium. For a full balance of
payments equilibrium to exist there must be no borrowing
or lending of any kind taking place* This condition is
necessary, because as long as borrowing is taking place
there is an invisible import represented by the interest
payments on the debt. As these interest payments mount
24Robinson, oj>, cit,, p, 101,
up over the life of the debt (other things being equal) 
the persistently borrowing nation will have a failing bal­
ance of trade. Full long period equilibrium is said to 
exist only when * * * * interest and savings are equal to 
zero, and imports are equal to e x p o r t s ,"25 However, since 
this state is very seldom, if ever, attained in the real 
world, we shall concentrate oar attention on the process 
of attaining an exchange equilibrium, the main conditions 
of which are that interest payments are small in relation 
to current borrowing, and there is no gold movement or 
transfer borrowing taking place*
Given the case in which the home rate of interest 
rises, if other things remain equal, there will be a , 
three-stage effect on the exchange rate* In the first 
stage there is an increase in the level of foreign borrow­
ing as a result of the increase in the domestic rate Of 
interest* This increase in borrowing may be either an in­
crease in the share of world savings devoted to the home 
country, a situation that will persist as long as the state 
of confidence and the high relative rate Of interest is 
maintained, or a nonrecurrent inflow of funds formerly held 
abroad* Bach of the transfers involved in this shift can
25Ibid», p. 100.
affect the exchange rate only as it is made so that to 
maintains given volume of transfers over a period of time 
there, would have to he a constant rise in the relative 
interest ratej therefore, they are generally nonrecurring 
in nature* In this stage the rate Of exchange is not in 
equilibrium,since there is a considerable amount of trans­
fer borrowing as a resul t of the rise in the domes tic rate 
of interest* During the second stage of its effect the 
rise in the interest rate has a tendency to curtail domes­
tic investment and thereby induce a decline in the level 
of economic activity and incomes* A general curtailment 
of incomes and activity will force the export industry to 
contract* In relative terms, the domestic export industry 
will not decline as much as the domestic import market, 
because a reduction in demand has a tendency to increase 
the supply of exportable goods; and at least part of the 
reduction of foreign incomes resulting from the decline of 
the domestic import market will be subtracted from savings 
with the result that foreign demand will not be .drastical* ■ 
ly effected* therefore, even if the supply price of ex* 
ports in the domestic market is uneffected by the decline 
in income and activity, it is still impossible for exports 
to be curtailed to the extent of imports. It follows that 
a rise in the domestic rate of interest tends to cause a
35
decline in imports relative to exports resulting in an in­
crease in the balance of trade, through this process of 
increasing the balance of trade the balance of payments is 
again brought into equilibrium* There is no need for fur­
ther transfer borrowing, and if the increase in the balance 
of trade is sufficient to equal the original increase in 
the balance of lending, there is no further need for an 
increase la the domestic rate of interest, All pressure 
has been removed from the rate of exchange and it is pos­
sible to say that at the given rate the balance of recur­
rent lending and the balance of trade are in equality at a 
stable rate of interest. This equilibrium, however, has 
been attained at the expense of employment in the home 
country.
The third stage of the effect of the interest rate 
is attained when the equilibrium rate of exchange is sus­
tained by a decrease in the domestic rate of money wages 
that results from the unemployment induced by the rise in 
the interest rate* This reduction in wages is absolutely 
necessary if the exchange equilibrium is to be maintained,
A decrease in domestic wages and a fall in the exchange 
rate both represent a decline in domestic incomes and 
prices measured in terms of foreign currency. The effect 
oh the value of imports and exports, in terms of foreign
currency* Is also the same for a fall in Mages as far 
'decline la the exchange rate since in bath'eases the domes* 
tic purchasing -power -of a given amount of foreign currency 
increa^S': by ̂ anreqnai amount, the net effect of the do* . 
crease' in/wages is an .Increase in . the baiane e of trade ’ 
correspoading to a given level of effective demand in the 
domestic martst and the'balance of\naymenfs is maintained 
in equilibrium^'
The conclusion that can' be- drawn from, the above :
* i
analysis is that, as Dr. Eoe f inds, w -. * . exchange adjust*.' 
ment is an intricate network of interacting basic elements 
in/a system of mutual dependence,"26 There is no one 'ffci*.- 
of exchange which is an equilibrium rate corresponding- to 
the-state-of world demand and technology. There is, how* 
everf 'In:asy.given situation an equilibrium rate eorre- 
spending to a level of effective demand and' rate-of inter* 
est*. it is':possible- to make nearly 'any rate -Of exchange.' 
the equilibrium rate by Siteflag the interest rate; or on - 
the. ether habd* it is possible to make any' rate of ex­
change co^patibie'. with any interest rate provided money 
wages,can be sufficiently altered*
8?
II. THE THEORY OP EXCHANGE RATES 
UNDER EXCHANGE CONTROL
A necessary preface to the theory of exchanges 
under control is a description Of the institutional frame* 
worh in which exchange control developed, 3
Exchange controls can best he viewed as ah expres­
sion of the general trend toward a greater expression of 
national economic policy and interest in the field of in* 
ternational economic relations, the general conditions 
that gave rise to this tendency have heen outlined by 
Dr. Stevens as beingi
A retardation in the twentieth century of the ex­
pansionary economic dynamic which seems, retrospec­
tively, to have character!zed the nineteenth. An An* 
giocentrie world became decentralized in terms of 
(a) political and military power, (b) industrial pro­
ductive power, and (c) financial relationships.
International peace became less secure,
The scope and effectiveness of positive govern­
mental powers increased enormously*27
Under the influence of these general conditions in 
the course of several decades national monetary policy
27Robert Waren Stevens, ^Partial Equilibrium in the 
Theory of. International Be^no^nies,, (unpublished Doctoral 
Dissertation* University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, .1049),
p. 112*
throughout the world has gradually shifted its emphasis 
from external to internal stability* As a result of this 
shift the balance of payments* which originally had been 
the chief object of official concern* became a secondary 
matter., thile this shif t in national economic thinking 
was taking place* there was a series of developments which 
led to new problems in the balance of payments* these 
were: (1) the volume of liquid funds (cash and short term
securities) increased considerably, (2) the experience of 
World war I and its economic aftermath undermined the 
confidence in the major currencies of the world* and (3) 
trade barriers and other obstacles to trade were multi­
plied, The net effect of these developments was that the 
danger of capital flight was intensified and nations were 
deprived of a means of quick and easy correction of bal­
ance of payments disequilibium on capital and current ac­
count.
The logical outcome of these conflicting trends was 
foreign exchange control* The national state came to be 
recognised as an economic unit making unified rational 
choices to further the economic interest of its people.
So the national state assumed the task of deciding when 
the welfare of the nation could be maximized by altering 
the conditions of international trade. In most cases the
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original legislation establishing exchange control was of 
an emergency character which later underwent much experi­
mentation and change. However, it is possible to general­
ize and say that restrictive national policies seem to 
have been resorted to in order to serve some more or less 
clear-cut national economic interest such as protection of 
the balance of payments, stability of currency, or nation­
al self-sufficiency*
Types and degrees of exchange control. The earliest 
types of exchange control originated under the internation­
al gold standard, ttoder this standard the exchange rate 
of a nation, in which money wages do not readily yield to 
the pressure of unemployment, could only be maintained by 
recurrent period of severe unemployment. The central 
banks of these nations developed certain monetary means of 
preserving the stability of the exchange rate within cer­
tain narrow limits while still being able to meet the de­
mands of domestic credit policy* Stabilization funds and 
dealings in forward exchange were the two most important 
means devised by the banks*
The system of forward exchanges suggested by Keynes 
was intended as a means of enabling a central bank to raise 
or lower its discount rate relative to foreign rates with­
out thereby attracting or repelling foreign short-term
funds, For example, if the Bank, of England wished to 
lower the bank rate without causing an efflux of money, it 
would offer to sell forward exchange at a discount equiva­
lent to the reduction in the short-term interest rate caused 
by the redaction la the bank rate. According to Ur* J&oo, 
there is one severe limitation in the use of the system of 
forward exchanges* He says n * • * the bank still cannot 
prevent an outflow of.money by selling forward exchange 
for which spot exchange is already at or near gold export 
point, or an inflow of money when the spot quotation is at 
or near the gold import point of foreign exchange*
This is true, because selling discounted forward exchange- 
at or near the gold point would result in a large specula­
tive movement of funds by arbitrageurs. Apparently the 
only advantage of using forward exchange lies in the pos­
sibility that under certain conditions gold movements can 
be prevented and the economic community given encourage­
ment in speculative activity while at the same time a 
lower interest rate would be established without unneces­
sary psychological disturbance*
t
The stabilisation fund was originally intended as a 
device to enable countries on inconvertible paper standard
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to achieve a certain degree of exchange stability with na»
tions on the gold standard* It was not until England 
' ' . *. . ' '
started to use it successfully as a means of insulating
the domestic market that it was discovered that it was
possible to achieve a dual purpose by stabilizing the ex*
change rate*
After the collapse of the gold standard the stabi­
lization fund was retained* Through the operation of the 
fund the exchange rate was "pegged*' in terms of some 
standard such as gold or foreign currency* The pegged 
rate can only be maintained by a government or some other 
agency which stands ready to buy and sell unlimited a-
•e
mounts of currency at the pegged rate* The difference 
between the official buying and selling rates defines the 
limits within which the rates may fluctuate* The stabili­
ty of the exchange rate under a system of pegged exchanges 
generally imposes no restriction on demand, not even the 
restriction of a higher price (except within the buying 
and selling rates), nor can pegging increase a nation^ re­
serves of gold and foreign exchange. The essential func­
tion of the stabilization fund is the mobilization of the 
existing foreign exchange resources in such a way that the 
foreign value of the home currency can be maintained by 
the supplementary demand and supply of the monetary author-
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ity, Consequently,, the pegging process is no stronger 
than the resources of gold and foreign exchange available 
to the administrating authority. Once these resources are 
exhausted: there is nothing left to peg with unless foreign 
loans .are'relied .upon as temporary 'relief;*
An apiilye or passive balance of payments under a 
gold -standard;or any system of stable exchanges tends to 
cause expansion or contraction not only in the stock of 
money but in the flow of money incomes as well. HOutrali- 
cation by means of a stabilization fund can only stabilize 
the national monetary supply or the cash base of the do­
mestic credit system,# therefore, even if the quantity of 
money outstanding is rendered insensitive to gold and 
capital flows, the incomes, and hence the stability of 
employment, are still influenced by the balance of pay­
ments* In the Quest for greater internal stability a con­
stant Quantity of money is not enough for achieving this 
.aim, and in some cases may not even be desirable.
The existence of an equilibrium rate of exchange is 
a prerequisite to. the selective offsetting of gold and 
capital flows, If the rate of exchange of a country is 
undervalued, the influx of short-term and long-term capi­
tal in the form of purchases of OQuity securities cannot 
be justified solely on the grounds of the relative yield
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and interest rate. Since, as noted above, the stabiliza­
tion fund can influence both the rate of exchange and do­
mestic credit, the operators of the fund mast havej (1) 
the criteria for finding an equilibrium level of the rate 
of exchange and (2) the criteria for the selective off­
setting of gold and capital flows. So long as there is a 
more or less routine policy of offsetting movements of the 
foreign balance while the rate of exchange is at an equi­
librium level or in a state of finding its equilibrium 
level with no disturbance in other important currencies, 
the operation of the stabilization fund is likely to be 
successful. But as soon as the disturbance in the ba­
lance of payments comes from say, a world-wide depression 
culminating in unstable currencies of other nations, the 
monetary authority in charge of the stabilization fund 
will face the dilemma of either minimizing the variations 
of the rate of exchange of an important currency or main­
taining the proper relationship between domestic prices 
and the rest of the world. Dr. Koo finds that
In the short period, in order to maintain the con­
tinuity in financial transactions, it is desirable 
that the rate should be maintained as far as possible. 
But for the maintenance of economic interrelationships 
of a more fundamental character, wide variations in 
market fluctuations may not be inappropriate.2**
29Ibid., p. 185.
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It appears, therefore, that the stabilization fund does 
not offer any permanent escape from the old conflict be­
tween stable exchanges and stable prices*
In times of international instability there has 
been a tendency for nations to attempt to solve the prob­
lem of deciding whether to offset variations in key cur­
rencies or maintain proper price relationships with the 
world by adopting a more strict type of exchange control 
under which the national reserves of foreign exchange are 
more completely controlled* Under such systems all the 
receipts of foreign exchange are concentrated in the hands 
of the monetary authority and licenses are required for 
the use of foreign exchange. This does not, of course, 
increase the supply of foreign exchange, but it does make 
rationing a more effective means of control. The monetary 
authority has absolute power over the allocation of for­
eign exchange reserves, and therefore it may through a 
rationing program exert a very strong influence over how 
the importers of the nation use the. exchange reserves.
The strict form of exchange control is differentiated from 
the free rate by the fact that under the former foreign 
exchange is no longer freely available to all that can 
meet the price* Under strict control the monetary author­
ity decides who will get exchange, " . . .  and the decision
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is, at the core, unavoidably political♦«30
It is possible to distinguish two degrees of strict 
exchange control: (1) the control of capital movements and
(2) control of current account transactions, The first 
degree of control is at present generally regarded as being 
preferable to monetary instability and hence is respectable. 
The International Monetary Fund permits, and even in some 
cases requires, control over capital movements, while it 
frowns on control of current account transactions except 
as an emergency measure.
Members may exercise such controls as are necessary 
to regulate international capital movements, but no 
member may exercise these controls in such a manner 
which will restrict payments on current transactions 
or which will unduly delay transfers of funds in set­
tlement of commitments except as provided in Article 
VII, Section 3 (b), and in Article XIV, Section 2,3-1
The most advanced type of exchange control, and the 
one most often resorted to by nations with chronic balance 
of payments disequilibrium, is strict exchange control
i
with rationing of exchange on both capital and current ac­
count, The remainder of the discussion will be carried on 
in terms of this type of control.
3^Marsh, oj>. cit.« p. 197.
31The International Monetary Fund, Articles of 
Agreement. "Control of Capital Transfers,” (International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, B. C., 1944), Article VI, Sec­
tion III, p. 12.
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The functions of exchange control* The following 
are some of the main functions that exchange control per­
forms (1) it is a powerful instrument of monetary policy 
for. the protection of: exchange reserves and the mainte­
nance of exchange stability under conditions where the 
traditional central bank techniques have failed} <2) it 
serves as a means of regulating foreign trade and imple­
menting the bilateral obligations willingly or unwilling­
ly assumed by many nations; (8) it serves as an instrument 
of economic development through the protection and stimu­
lation that if can provide for growing industries and 
through the husbanding of exchange reserves for develop­
ment purposes; (4) it is the means by which many govern­
ments may exert a greater degree of political and economic 
control * and serve as a means of revenue.82
The determination of exchange rates under a system 
of exchange control does not lend itself readily to gener­
alization since the fundamental factor in the determina­
tion of rates under control is the authority^ estimation 
of the national interest and welfare* tfcifortunately there 
are few criteria that can be used determining the welfare
32Henry Christopher wailich, Monetary Problems of 
an Export. Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1950/ , p. 255.' '
interests of a nation. However, it is possible, despite 
this handicap, to consider some of the principles that 
must he followed in an attempt by a national authority to 
determine an exchanj»e rate that is in harmony with extern 
nai obligations and gives some promise of permanence. In 
general the object of the controlling authority is to ae* 
loot,
. • a rate which in the light of prospective 
conditions* including governmental policies and pro-* 
grams (fiscal policies.'* tariffs' and' Other restrictions 
on trade),* gives promise of yielding an approximate, 
balance in a country*® foreign account over a period 
Of years Cin so far' as a' rate by. itself can do this)* ■ 
and will at the same time provide cost and Income 
relationships with foreign countries which will permit 
a maximum flow of trade in both directions at a high 
level of domestic activity and employment,33
It appears then that the object of exchange control is to 
select and maintain a stable exchange rate that will give 
equilibrium in the balance of payments.
Establishing of an equilibrium' rate Of exchange 
under exchange control is a complicated matter* It is 
made especially so by the fact that under controls equi­
librium can be forced at nearly any rate, Once selected a 
given, rate can be maintained indefinitely as long as do­
mestic incomes' and. activity are adjusted to external, 
changes*' ' However* these internal adjustments are just
33foung* oj>, elf.,* p.* 389.
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what exchange, control attempts to avoid. The ideal ex­
change rate in the eyes of the monetary authority of a na­
tion is one which is stable, bat does not require varia­
tions in the internal economy to maintain that stability, 
hits# most ideals this one is impossible of attainment* An 
ideal exchange rate could only be possible in a world in 
which the international economy was completely stable*
Such a universal equilibrium is difficult to imagine in 
the, real world* Falling short of the ideal, the object of
. . . .  1
exchange control is to select a rate that will give the
highest level of domestic activity possible in any given
world situation, dnee the rate is selected the function
of exchange control is to prevent excesses of supply or
demand from affecting the rate. Changes in the rate are
only infrequently permitted under exchange control*
In commodity markets, under perfect competition, an
excess of supply or demand at the prevailing price results
in price change. Similarly, in the absence of arbitrary
interference in the market it may happen that due to an
excess demand the demand and supply of foreign exchange
will be equal only at a depreciated rate, Woodly says that
tJhder such circumstances the balance Of payments 
disequilibrium which may be said to exist is complete­
ly parallel to the hypothetical disequilibrium in the 
commodity market of perfect competition when the price 
is not equivalent to that indicated by the intersec-
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tion of supply and demand.
Under free exchange the disequilibrium will be 
eliminated by a decline in the exchange rate, or as indi­
cated by the general theory of exchanges a change in the 
domestic interest rate. Under exchange controls, if the 
monetary authority refuses to alter the rate, there will 
be a chronic excess demand for foreign exchange reflecting 
the too low price of foreign currency. This situation re­
quires that some measures be taken which will either re­
duce the demand for, or increase the supply of, foreign 
exchange, tftitil such measures are affected disequilibrium 
is said to exist in the balance of payments and the ex­
change rate can only be maintained by the reduction of ex­
change reserves or balance of payments borrowing* Since 
neither loss of exchange reserves or balance of payments 
borrowing can be long-run policies some means must be 
found to "remedy" the balance of payments disequilibrium 
and stop the dependence on temporary financing* The rem­
edies for balance of payments disequilibrium have been 
discussed. They are changes in incomes and prices and 
shifts in the allocation of resources.
^4'«'illiam J* R. Tfoodly, "Canada*s Post-War Balance 
of Payments? A Case Study of Remedies for Balance of Pay­
ments Disequilibrium" (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 
Cornell University, Ithaca, 1949), p. 15.
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Under 3 trie t exchange control an excess demand for 
foreign exchange is met by rationing available exchange 
resources* toungf in examining the effect of the free 
rate and the controlled rate on the volume of trade, finds 
that:
It is possible* although unlikely, that a rate that 
requires rationing of exchange will yield as large a 
volume of trade is spite of the restrictions and pro*
; hibifi©as placed on many transactions and the reduced 
incentive to exports,^5
the possibility of having as large a volume of trade under
a rate which requires rationing as under a free rate only
arises when the controlled rate provides more favorable
terms of trade and thereby permits a nation to pay for the
same or even more imports with the same or even fewer ex*
ports which are sold at higher prices in terms of domestic
currency* In such a case the total volume of trade would
not be reduced by exchange controls, HOweveri as Toung
assertst «It is doubtful whether such a situation exists
in the case of many, if any cow* tries**®®
lie conclusion that can be drawn from the above
analysis is that exchange control as a long-run policy is
inconsistent for a nation that is attempting to maximize
external trade* In the dynamic world any exchange rate once
3S¥otmg, 0£. pit*, p. 501. 36lbid*
i
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established is subject to disequilibratiag forces* Under 
exchange rationing there would be a reduction in the vol­
ume of trade until the disequilibrium was corrected*
Although inconsistent as a long-run policy exchange 
control still has considerable merit as a short-run method 
of meeting a disequilibrium in the balance of payments*
One of the conditions that is the most conducive to the 
use of exchange control is the temporary emergency situa­
tion in which a nation suffers a short-run balance of pay­
ments disequilibrium* An example of this situation would 
be a deficit on the balance of trade as a result of a crop 
failure or some relatively short run disturbance* It is 
preferable in such cases to use exchange controls rather 
than permit the machinery of fundamental readjustment to 
start operating when it seems clear that the disequilib-. 
rium is only temporary.
Another strong case for exchange control is the 
fact that such a system allows a nation to select the 
types of imported goods that are the most useful to the 
economy, especially goods that are needed to promote eco­
nomic development, this was the case in the immediate 
postwar world when many nations used exchange controls as 
a means of concentrating their reserves of foreign ex­
change on the purchase of capital goods needed to rehabi-
1 i tate 'f beAr devas tated economies. ■
#«stifioatioa-■i'OiO exchange control can fee found in.
eases*. Exchange control is essen­
tially -a- siep*gs|f It is not capable of dealing
with the conditions of a fundamental diseqailihriuia in the 
haiano:t' of payments* the solntioa of which lie® in ad$asi- 
in./the-domestic economy*. Sxchange controls may be 
nstfni ;'t# m'nation as a ‘means of postponing the solution 
of a fundamental disequilibriumor in stretching the sol ac­
tion over a period of time provided the nation in willing 
to accept the redaction in the volume of trade that re- 
salt# from;-ratiohiag Of exchange* the real value of ex­
change control* in the last analysis* is the elimination 
of abrupt nhange® Ip the internal economy*
THE CAMDIAN EXGBANEE BATE 
I, THE EXGHx''iNGE BATE HISTORICALLY (1857-1939)
The Canadian dollar, which was adopted as Canada*s 
official unit of account in 1857, was the equivalent of 
15/73 of a pound sterling* i,e, the pound at par was worth 
I 4,866 in Canadian currency. This rate of exchange was 
maintained with only slight variations between the import 
and export gold points until the Outbreak of World War I* 
Except for the period 1867-78, when the united States dol­
lar was not redeemable in gold, the Canadian and United 
States dollar exchanged at par. But from 1878 until World 
i&r I the -Americas exchange rate fluctuated between the 
gold points (under $ 2 per $ 1,00©),
iSfeen the United Kingdom and Canada abandoned the 
gold standard at the outbreak of Uorld War % the pound 
sterling and the Canadian dollar were discounted in the 
lew York exchange market. The discount was kept from 
falling too far by the sale of American assets by the 
United Kingdom, and by direct borrowing in the United 
States, After the American entry into the war the United 
States government through a series of loans aided Canada 
and the United Kingdom in maintaining their rates.
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In the immediate postwar period all support was 
removed from the exchange rates and the British pound went 
as low as $ 3,18 and the Canadian dollar as low as 82 cents 
in the Hew 'fork market. By 1921 the rates had practically 
returned to par* and in April, 1926 the United Kingdom 
resumed gold paymentts. Canada followed salt on duly 1, 
1926, From 1926 until 1929 the rates remained within the 
gold import and export points, However, is 1929 the Cana-* 
dlan dollar fell to a slight discount in Hew York* this 
condition prevailed with only a few exceptions Until 1939 
and the outbreak of World Wat* II. the discount of this 
period was not severe since the dollar rates were below 
the gold export point for only a few scattered intervals,
IX, WAITIMvMCHAHSSS: {1939-1945)
Immediately on the outbreak of World War II the 
United Kingdom and the other nations of the sterling area 
introduced exchange controls. The buying and selling 
rates of the pound were set at $ 4*025 respectively in 
terms of United States dollars. In addition, the United 
Kingdom, in order to conserve its reserves of American 
dollars, ended the free convertibility of sterling# The 
rate of the Canadian dollar in the Hew York market imme­
diately began to decline, Knox explains the situation as
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on© in which:
Jfe Cthe Canadians! are dependent , . on the free 
convertibility and a high value of sterling in lew 
York, When sterling has fallen there, so has the 
Canadian dollar; when convertibility of sterling into 
American dollars has been restricted, rigid control of 
the of American dollars has been forced upon us,*
Five days after Canada entered the war on September 
10, 1939, the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board came 
into being,; The main functions of this Board were: Cl)
to maintain the balances of foreign exchange and market- 
able foreign securities in order that the existing foreign 
assets would not be dissipated by their owners; (2) to 
control exports and imports so that a minimum of strain was 
placed on the balance of payments by variations in the ex­
change rate;2 <3) to control the exports of foreign and 
domestic capital in order to prevent large amounts of cap­
ital from leaving the country at a time that it was sorely 
needed and to eliminate any pressure on the exchange rate 
from capital flight, Woodly assigns the most importance 
to this last function, He says, "The chief purpose of ex-
*F, A, Knox, “Canada*s Balance of International Pay­
ments 1940-45,!* Canadian Journal of Economics and Political 
Science, Kill (August, 1947>, 345,,
2A s Knox says: "The decision to end the convertibi­
lity of sterling in Hew fork split the Canadian balance of 
payments into two independent sections* one with the dollar 
and one with the sterling area," Ibid*» p, 346,
change control was to assure that there would not he de­
mands oil dollar reserves through capital outflow supple­
mentary to those on current account***^ 5
fhQ basis for wartime foreign exchange control was 
established in 1905 with the organization of a foreign ex­
change fund* The Bank of Canada was established in 1935, 
and at that time much emphasis was placed on its role in 
influencing international finance and exchange rates*
This was indicated in the declaration of purpose of the 
Ac tt
♦ * • to establish a central bank in Canada, to 
regulate credit and currency in the best interest of 
the economic life of the nation, to control and pro­
tect the external value of the national monetary unit 
and to mitigate by its influence fluctuations in the 
general level of production, trade, prices* and em­
ployment.4
Legislation accompanying this act created an exchange 
stabilization fund. The fund* however* was never used to 
influence the external value of the dollar. The main rea­
son for not using the fund was the lack of serious varia-
%illiam J. R* loodly, ^Canadais Post-ft'ar Balance 
of payment's j A Case Study of Remedies, for Balance of Pay­
ments Mse^uilihriom* (unpublished Pectoral dissertation* 
Cornell University, ifhaca> 1949), p. 84*
40ominion of Canada, George t*, 25-26 (1935), €« 60* 
(cited by Weedly, op. cit*, p*
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fions in the exchange rate,5 When the Foreign Exchange 
Beard was created under the emergency war powers of the 
government, the assets of the stabilization fund were turned 
over to it. On April 30, 1940, an Order in Council com- 
polled the sale of all domestically held exchange to the 
Board, and at the same time the Bank of Canada transferred 
its holdings of gold and exchange to the Board*
Although the policies applied by the Board were 
extremely complex and varied, they did follow certain guid­
ing principles., The main principle of operation appears in 
the provision of the Act creating the Board which required 
that “Wo person shall export any good, currency, securities* 
foreign exchange or other property from Canada except under 
and in accordance with the terms of a license granted by 
the Board*1*5 The Board adopted the policy that all ex­
ports must be paid for in United States dollars or curren­
cy that was freely convertible, The only exception was in 
the case of Commonwealth countries where Canadian dollars 
or Sterling would be accepted. The proceeds of all goods
5hOodly'says that *No significant variations oc­
curred* however, because of the stable relations between 
sterling and the United States dollar provided by the Tri­
partite Agreement,* goodly, op. clt., p, 81.
%0minion of Canada, Privy Council, 2718 (September, 
15, 1939X* (cited by Knox, op, cit,« p.354). '
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and services exported to the dollar area had to be turned 
over to the Board. The Board sold United States dollars 
at a given rate for all customary imports and payments for 
services. On capital account the Board refused to convert 
to United States dollars the proceeds of non-resident 
sales of securities, but it did provide foreign exchange 
for the payment of current earnings on foreign capital. 
Foreign investors were free to sell their securities at 
any time so long as an equal amount was invested in other 
Canadian securities. These capital restrictions of the 
Board applied only to securities outstanding before the 
imposition of exchange controls.
There were no controls on the holding of sterling 
in Canada. Payments could be made for imports in Canadian 
dollars or sterling; and Canadian exports could be sold 
for sterling or Canadian dollars, so long as the former 
had been obtained through legitimate exchange control 
channels. The reason for this lack of Canadian control 
over sterling is explained by *oodly as being the result 
of * * • ♦ the shortage of Canadian dollars abroad which 
placed the need for controls on the foreign exchange con­
trol authorities in the sterling area countries.
%oodly, op. cit., p. 86.
fhe Canadian wartime exchange situation became 
complicated in late 1940 and 1941* The characteristic 
bilateral imbalance of the Canadian balance of* payments 
was intensified by the lack of convertibility* Canada was 
determined to supply the United Kingdom with all the war 
materials that she possibly could afford, but to do this 
meant increased imports from the United States at a time 
when the customary methods of acquiring the means of pay­
ments could not be used* Consequently, Canada experienced 
heavy losses on current account with the Uni ted States 
during 1940-41 * these losses cut deeply into the Canadian 
reserves of foreign exchange and gold* Canada experienced 
a severe dollar shortage* However, this dollar shortage 
was not reflected in the exchange rate which remained at 
the official United States dollar and sterling buying and 
selling rates of $ 1*10 and $ 1.11* and $ 4*43 and | 4.47 
respectively, that had been established on September 15, 
1939*
In’the period from 1939 to 1941 the Canadian balance 
of trade with the sterling area was very favorable due to 
the heavy British demand for war materials* The net credit 
balance on current account rose from $ 137,000,990 in 1939 
to 734,000,000 in 1941, in normal times the British paid 
for their imports from Canada with American dollars and
iio
convertible sterling, but in the war period Britain was 
using all available United States dollar reserves for the 
direct purchase of American goods, and, therefore* incon­
vertible sterling was the only means of payment available 
to the Canadians, the Canadian balance on current account 
with the United States increased its net negative balance 
from $ 116,000,000 in 1039 to $ 316,000,000 in 1941* the 
greater part of this increase was the result of Canadian 
purchases of component parts of tanks, trucks, airplanes, 
and partly manufactured goods for further processing and 
Shipment to the United Kingdom* Canada was selling more 
to Britain than she was buying, and buying more from the 
United States than she wap selling there, not an unusual 
situation for Canada, but complicated by the fact that 
excess sterling could not be used to make up the differ* 
ence*
Lend-Lease aid from the United States could have 
offered a remedy to the Canadian trading problem, but Ca­
nada was not eligible for aid under the program* One of 
the main conditions for eligibility under Lend-lease was 
that the nation to receive aid had exhausted all possible 
means of dollar payment before receiving assistance, Ca­
nadian holdings of United ,States securities and direct in­
vestment were extremely high in relation to her size? and
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the forced liquidation of these assets would have been 
especially harmful to Canada since the proceeds would not 
be used for internal purposes but for aid to Britain* fhe 
loss of these assets would have represented an absolute 
decline in home investment funds at a time when they were 
needed the most.
A solution to the Canadian dollar shortage was 
found after the American entry into the war in December, 
1940* The Hyde Park Declaration of April 20, 1941, was 
the result of joint British, Canadian, and American nego­
tiations* The essence of the declaration was that:
* « » as a general principle in mobilizing the 
resources of this continent each country should pro­
vide the other with the defence articles which it is. 
best able to produce, and above all, to produce 
quickly, and, that production programs should be co­
ordinated to this end.8
This in effect meant that the United States would 
purchase those goods vital to the war effort that Canada 
could produce best and concentrate its efforts on other 
goods. The United States thereby furnished Canada with 
the funds necessary to purchase the American goods used to 
aid Br5 tain* A further provision was made in the Lend-
8Dominion of Canada, &ebat&g.> ^SmS. gfflgfflW,, 
1941, Vol. Ill (April 28, 1941), p* 2286. (cited by 
Inox, op* cit., p. 350).
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Lease policy that also helped solve the Canadian dollar 
shortage; Great Britain was permitted to purchase compo­
nent parts in the United States under Lend-Lease and for­
ward them to Canada for assembly* this relieved Canada of 
the drain on reserves that the purchase of parts had former­
ly represented*
Ah indication of the success of the Hyde Park Plan 
is the fact that the net negative balance on current ac­
count with the United States fell from $ 318,000,000 in 
1941 to $ 19,000,000 in 1943* During the same period the 
Canadian holdings of gold and United States dollars rose 
from $ 187,600,000 to $ 649,000,000* Another indication 
of the success of the plan is pointed out by Knox, who 
says,
* , . Canada was able to avoid direct government 
borrowing in the United States to maintain its ex­
change position and was able to add to our exchange 
reserves the whole of the capital imports which re­
sulted from the sale of privately owned securities in 
the United States*9
To sum up, the Canadian wartime dollar shortage 
that resulted from the great increase in imports from the 
United States, and inability to convert sterling to pay 
for them, was solved in part by the control of exports of 
capital through exchange control, the sale of munitions
%hox, op* cit* * p. 351.
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and war supplies to the Uhited States government* the 
United States expenditures in Canada* the abnormally large 
sale of grain to the United States, and the persistent and 
growing trend of American investors to purchase Canadian 
bonds (a trend from 1942).10
The United Kingdom*s section of the Canadian bal­
ance sheet was unaffected by the forces that solved the 
difficulties in the American balance. The Canadian dollar 
deficit of the sterling area averaged over a billion dol­
lars a year from 1942 to 1945. During 1939 and 1940 Ca­
nada had demanded that payment for export to the sterling 
area be made in gold or United States dollars and only 
when these were exhausted would Canadian dollars and se­
curities be accepted. In 1942 the situation became seri­
ous* The sterling area could only provide sterling to pay 
for its purchases. It was virtually impossible to balance 
the sterling account, which had grown from a net positive 
balance on Canadian current account of $ 1,223,000,000 in 
1942 (the highest in the history of British-Canadian trade). 
Increased Canadian imports as a method of offsetting this 
balance was out of question in view of the demands of the
10C. D. Blyth, "Some Aspects of Canada*s Interna­
tional Financial Relations," Canadian lattcaal, SiL Sfi.gn,ttaica 
and Political Science. XII (August, 1946), 303-04.
war Effort on overseas economies*. likewise, because of 
the war effort, thevolume of Canadian exports to the 
sterling area could not be reduced* fhe Canadian govern** 
ment, however, was unwilling to continue accepting large 
amounts of Inconvertible sterling as payments for exports* 
A solution to the problem was arrived at in 1942 when the 
Canadian Parliament voted a Mutual Aid export credit of a 
billion dollars to the United Kingdom* No assets were ex­
changed; the export credit was a drawing account that the 
United Kingdom could use to supplement whatever other ac­
ceptable means of payment it could find* In subsequent 
Mutual Aid appropriation acts a total of $ 2,250,000,000 
was expended for aid to the United Nations in the years 
1943-45, Eighty-five percent of this total went to the 
United Kingdom,
fhe effect of Mutual Aid and other loans made to 
the sterling area was to relieve the sterling section of 
the Canadian balance of payments of the severe strain im­
posed by the sterling areas lack of Canadian dollars. 
Mutual Aid did not result, however* in an equilibrium in 
the Canadian balance of payments with the sterling area* 
Continued overseas exports at the high levels of the war 
years were absolutely dependent upon continued leading by 
Canada, lending which, as noted in Chapter II, Canada
1X5
could ill afford. Fortunately, the Hutual Aid program was 
only intended as a short run emergency measure? the real 
adjustment that would give equilibrium in the balance of 
payments was postponed until after the war* But in spite 
of the postponement even so some fundamental changes in 
British-Canadian trade relations did take place as a re­
sult of Hutual Aid* A considerable portion of the Canadi­
an holdings of inconvertible sterling and accumulated ex­
port credits were used to repatriate British holdings of 
Canadian securities* This constituted a vital step in 
Canada’s growth toward creditor nation standing.
Despite all the difficulties of the wartime dollar 
shortage and the fluctuating state of Canadian exchange 
reserves during the war period, the exchange rate remained 
at the official rate established in 1939*
III. POSTIvAH EXCHANGES
The main developments in the Canadian economy from 
1940 to 1945 played an important role in establishing the 
postwar pattern of international trade and finance. The 
most important of these developments was the basic change 
in the structure of the economy and the nature of govern­
ment control policies, especially those that affected the 
value and direction of exports, imports, and capital
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movements. It was also during this period (1940-45) that 
the problem of financing the export surplus with the 
sterling area and developing means to remove the current 
account deficit with the dollar area became critical, It 
were these same problems that disrupted the Canadian bal­
ance of payments in 1947 and 1948,
At the end of the war in 1945 the continued heavy 
demand for Canadian exports and the satisfactory state of 
the exchange reserves made it possible for the Exchange 
Control Board to lower the selling rate of the Canadian 
dollar from $ 1,11 to $ 1,105, The Board also greatly 
relaxed the exchange control on current payments and re­
moved almost all the wartime trade restrictions. Follow­
ing the success of these changes the Board restored the 
rate on the United States dollar to par with buying and 
selling rates of $ 1.00 and $ 1,005 on July 6, 1946.
However, the healthy trend of 1945-46 did not 
continue. The Canadian holdings of foreign exchange fell 
$ 263 million in 1946 and $ 743 million in 1947, reducing 
the reserves from their peak of $ 1,508 million in 1945 
to a low of $ 501 million in 1947. The seriousness of 
the exchange problem that faced Canada is evidenced by the 
fact that if the average monthly loss of $ 62 million that 
occurred in the first ten months of 1947 had continued,
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Canada*s exchange reserves would have been completely ex­
hausted by aid 3.948* The Canadian government had a half 
year before depreciation of the exchange rate was forced 
upon them*1?- arlthin this time the government would have 
to find some type of remedy for the balance of payments 
disequilibrium that was causing the exchange difficulty*
The root causes of the difficulties of 1946 and 
1947 can be found in an analysis of the factors accounting 
for a demand in excess of the supplies available without 
drawing on exchange reserves.12
One of the most important of these causes was the 
postwar prosperity manifesting itself in a rise in con­
sumption levels in 1946 and a growing rate of domestic in­
vestment in 1947. This increased consumption and invest­
ment caused a greatly increased demand for American im­
ports*- At the time that the demand for dollar imports was 
rising, the Canadian government -Mas financing hie sterling 
areafs deficit on current^account with export credits and 
loans amounting, to § 1,§09 million in this two-year period
-^Depreciation was especially undesirable at this 
time since the export industries *?eFe at peak production 
and the depreciation, which represents a cut in price for 
these industries, would not have been able to increase de­
mand relative to the price decrease* Consequently, the 
depreciation would have resulted in a decrease in the bal­
ance of trade*
i%oodly, 0£. cit., p* 101*
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(1945-46), As a result of this situation a largo portion 
of Canadian exports did not produce exchange that could be 
used to pay for imports.
The total Canadian balance of payments showed con­
siderable- overall strength during 1947 and 1948 with cur­
rent surpluses Of $ 454 million and $ 85 million respee* 
tively. These surpluses are indicative of Canada’s abili­
ty to obtain hard currency for all exports except those 
financed by export credits and loans* As noted previous­
ly, the Canadian economy was not in a position to export 
capital and in the postwar period the international ac­
counts could not bear the burden of the lending program.
To understand the forces leading to the difficul­
ties arising from the extension of credits and the balance 
of trade, it is necessary to take account of the bilateral 
disequilibrium of Canada’s postwar international trans­
actions. The sterling area represents a traditional mar­
ket for a large portion of the total Canadian exports.
Due to the need© of the reconstruction program in the post­
war period, the demand of the sterling area for Canadian 
exports was much greater than its supply of hard currencies 
to pay for them. Canadian credits and loans were necessary 
if sales to this traditional market were to be maintained.
In effect, the credit program was a means of assur-
inf domestic prosperity by providing a market for the Ca­
nadian export indus try , and a me thod of speedingup Euro­
pean reconstruetioa so that exports could be put on a cash 
basis in the future, this second objective is most imports 
ant in the long run, since historically it has been the 
surplus from overseas trade that supplied Canada with the 
exchange necessary to carry on trade with the United 
States* The main objective of the credit program was to 
maintain Canada^s ability to create this surplus. However, 
as Goodly pointed out, ^Because imports were purchased 
largely from the United States a much larger overall sur­
plus [overseas] was required than actually developed if a
loss of reserves was to be avoided*813 So when the export 
of capital greatly exceeded the current account surplus,
the difference was financed by exchange reserves*
The bilateral disequilibrium of the Canadian bal­
ance of payments with the dollar area was intensified in 
the postwar period# The Canadian balance On current ac­
count with the United States fell from a net positive bal­
ance of $ 36 million in 1945 to a net negative balance of 
I 1,136 million in 1947. Daring this period over four- 
fiftfcg of total Canadian imports came from the United
States as compared with two-thirds before the war. Cense* 
quently, the Canadian demand for American dollars increased 
at the same time that the supply was decreasing' as a re­
sult of the foreign credit program and the inconvertibili­
ty of sterling# Several times in the past (the 1920*8 for 
example) when the Canadian demand for l&iited States dollar 
was greater than the supply Canada was able to make up the 
difference by importing capital from the United States, 
but in the period 1945-47 this was not possible,* there 
was a considerable inflow of American capital in 1944 and
1945 and the first half of 1946, but in the second half Of
1946 and in 1947 the movement practically ceased* this 
was due to the appreciation of the official rate of ex* 
change and sympathetic upward movement in the unofficial 
exchange market# the inflows of capital in the prewar and 
war years had been primarily the result of the discount of 
the unofficial exchange rate from parity* the reduction 
in the discount fate tended, therefore, to make Canadian 
investments less attractive to American -investors* fhe 
reduction of the discount rate also served as an induce* 
meat to withdraw fund invested since 1.939̂  and such with* 
drawals acted in part to offset new inflows* In 1947 and 
1943 Canada could not offset the increased demand for
tlnited States dollars with convertible sterling or the in*
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flow of American capital, Consequently* the deficit on 
current account with the United States had to be financed 
with exchange reserves*
To sum up t he main elements in Canada^s pos twar 
bilateral disequilibriurn on current accounts (1) there 
was a large current account surplus with the sterling area 
financed mainly by Canadian credits and convertible 
sterling* (2) the current account deficit with the dollar 
area financed with convertible sterling received from the 
sterling area and the drawing down of exchange reserves 
(see Table XII )♦ The main changes from the war years were 
the greatly increased current account deficit with the dol# 
lar area and the disappearance of the inflow of private 
capital from the United States.
In searching for a means of curing the bilateral 
disequilibrium that existed in the balance of payments the 
Canadian government was forced to. choose between several 
alternative'methods*. One method was to cut Off export 
credits so that the net surplus on current account would 
result in an addition to exchange reserves* provided* of 
course* that an outflow of private capital would not off­
set the decrease in credits* a movement which could be 
prevented by the controlling of exchange. This method 
necessarily assumes the continuation of exports at the
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TABLE XII
MAIM METHODS OF PIHANCINU CANADA'S BILATERAL 
CURRENT ACCOUNT, 1946 AND 19A? 
(Millions of Canadian Dollars)
1946 194?
Current account surplus with the sterling area 699 8?2
Financed by-
Canadian export credits and loans 436 328
Receipts of convertible sterling 150 505
Current account deficit with the dollar area 30? 825
Financed by
Transfer of exchange from the sterling area 150 505
Loss of exchange reserves 251 743
Source: William J. a. Woodly, "Canada's Post-War Balance of 
Payments; A Case Study of Remedies for Balance of Payments Disequi­
librium" (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University, 
Ithaca* 1949), p. 103.
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1947 level and the free conversion of the proceeds of 
these exports. Judging from the strained conditions of 
the exchange reserves in the sterling area, the 1947 level 
of Canadian exports could not be maintained unless other 
countries were willing to extend credit to the sterling 
area so that the proceeds could be spent in Canada. There­
fore, if other nations did not assume the burden of the 
Canadian credit program with the sterling area, Canadian
overseas trade would decline as credits were curtailed.
*
Any policy that might result in a decrease in the volume 
of external, trade was especially undesirable to Canada, 
since a decrease of any magnitude would result in an even 
greater percentage decrease in national income.14 Hence, 
a policy of reducing export credits would be inconsistent 
with fhe domestic policy of full employment and stable 
money incomes.
Another possible remedy of the Canadian exchange 
problem would be the devaluation of the Canadian dollar*
14The high Canadian export multiplier virtually 
eliminates any solution that would reduce the level of for­
eign trade* The Canadian multiplier has been estimated 
statistically for the period 1923-39, ", * * on the av­
erage over this period, an export of $ 1,00 in year R was 
followed by a national income received of $ 3.80 in year 
E t l . s Tse-Chun Chang, "A Note on Exports and National
In theory at least, devaluation would have the effect of 
increasing the price of imports, thereby decreasing their 
volume, It would also tend to induce a greater volume of 
exports because of.their reduced price in terms of foreign 
currency. However, devaluation was not practical In the 
Canadian situation, because, even if it did raise the im­
port price, it is doubtful if imports would have been 
reduced by much. Imports were primarily capital goods 
- of highly essential supplies such as coal, iron, and 
petroleum, the demand for which was relatively price in# 
elastic due to the high rate of income and activity in, 
Canada, fhe prospect that devaluation would stimulate ex­
ports is nullified by the fact that Canadian costs and 
prices were already generally below the world level, Ca­
nadian exports were limited more by physical capacity of 
the export industry than by price considerations*!®
Without an increase in exports the income effect of fhe 
devaluation on the Canadian economy would be deflationary 
and therefore undesirable*
A third alternative for solving the balance of pay­
ments difficulties was the possibility of changing the 
direction of Canadian exports either by direct controls or
i5Hoodly, op« pit,, p, 163,-
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under the stimulus, of price and credit restrictions* This 
technique would attempt to remedy the geographic imbalance
in the, trade pattern and thereby solve the exchange prob-1
lem, In reality this would direct Canadian exports away 
from the sterling area to the dollar market* This policy 
offers a practical, solution, but not a complete one* fhe 
restriction of exports to the sterling area is counter to 
Canadian long-term trade policy, which has been directed 
toward maintaining the traditional overseas market*
A fourth alternative is the reduction of imports, 
by higher prices or direct control, This would have the 
effect of reducing the volume of imports to a level 
where the proceeds of existing exports would be sufficient 
to pay for imports without drawing on exchange reserves* 
This remedy is of questionable value* because a rise in 
the price of imports would be inflationay and counter to 
the existing government anti-inflation policy. An in­
crease in the domestic price level would tend to reduce 
exports and start a decrease in the total foreign trade 
with undesirable multiple effects on the national income* 
In November of 1947 the Canadian government an­
nounced its program for remedying the exchange problem*
The over-all intention of the program was to meet the 
emergency situation in terms of the long-run adjustments
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that were necessary to put the Canadian balance of pay­
ments in fundamental equilibrium* The immediate objects 
of the program were: (1) decrease imports from the United
States where payments had to be made in United States dol­
lars, (2) increase imports from other countries where pay­
ments were made in other currencies, particularly pound 
sterling, (3) increase exports to the dollar area, (4) re­
duce the amount of export credits extended to other coun­
tries, particularly the United Kingdom*1® To achieve 
these objectives the government adopted stringent direct 
controls over imports and provided encouragement to certain 
types of exports. The import quotas and restrictions were 
imposed in such a way that they reduced imports from the 
United States without affecting foreign trade with other 
areas* Wartime export controls were relaxed and the cred­
its to European countries were reduced with the result 
that exports were directed to the United States, In addi­
tion, the government provided subsidies for the gold 
mining industries, attempted to direct industrial develop­
ment so that goods would be produced in Canada both to re-
»
place imports and to sell abroad, anc z;egotiated a loan
^Canadian Government, Department of External Affairs, 
Canada^ Foreign Trade. Reference Papers, Ro. 30 (Ottawa: 
Department of External Affairs, August, 1948), p. 3*
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from the Export Import Bank in Washington. The reason the 
government gave for adopting this type of policy was that 
the measures involved were superior to the only real alter­
native which was depreciation and deflation. The main 
argument advanced by the government was that direct con­
trols would have the least dislocating effect on the econ­
omy as a whole since they could be applied in a selective 
manner. With selective controls, restrictions and prohi­
bitions could be placed on those imports that were least 
essential, and particularly on those that increased the 
imbalance in Canada’s bilateral account.
The major part of the government’s remedial program 
was contained in the Emergency Exchange Conservation Aot 
of 1948. Under this Act imported goods were arranged in 
three "schedules*1 according to their importance to the 
Canadian economy. Schedule I goods were luxury goods» the 
importation of which could be curtailed without hardship. 
This class of goods was subject to severe prohibition. 
Schedule II goods were consumers goods, the volume of 
which could be reduced materially without an adverse ef­
fect on welfare. This class of goods was subject to 
quotas based on the volume of trade in prewar years, 
Schedule III goods were capital goods, machinery, and 
component parts of durable consumers goods which were con-
sldered''necessary" for fhe efficient functioning of the 
econ#iy#:' ImportationOf this class of goods required a-
license*-^/;'
:i.fhe' iiî tiange Conservation Act followed the gener­
al objective of deducing imports from the dollar area 
without cartailing the opportunities of exporters in the 
sterling and other soft currency areas* tinder the Act 
prohibitions were placed on schedule I goods that came 
predominantly from the dollar area* fhe quota# on sched­
ule IT goods were, arranged' in such a. way that they favored 
import#, from the sterling area and restricted those from 
the dollar: ares*; fhe administration of. schedule 1X1 was ■ 
carried ■ on -in„..a .manner devised to ■direct Canadian. iadtts<-' 
trial development Into a form that would make Canada less 
dependent on imports of capital goods and component parts* 
and more capable of maintaining it# exports to the dollar 
area*
During IDAS the disequilibrium in the Canadian bal- - 
ance'of payments was reduced and the reserves of foreign 
e«haage;'increase#1 by $ 4S§ million* ■ fhe principal changes 
in the balance of payments were in the capital an# current
11'i i
• 17D0minion of Canada, ^Statutory Orders & Regula­
tions,” fhe Panada Gazette.Part XX, No* 8*43* ?fel*-LXXXXX-(April ifr^r^tr^
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account with the United States. On capital account there 
was an increase in government borrowing in the Waited 
States and an inflow of private capital from the United 
States. On current account the net negative balance with 
the United States was reduced from $ 1,135 in 1947 to 
$ 393 million in 1943. A number of factors can be cited 
to account for the changes in the balance of payments, 
among the most important were: <1) changes in the volume
and direction of trade, (2) the provision for dollar 
financing of Canadian exports by the Economic Cooperation 
Administration, and (3) the decrease in Canadian export 
credits. Concerning the government policy and its influ­
ence on these changes, Goodly contends, that * . . . the
«
effect of import controls program of Jlarcb 1947 was large­
ly indirect, as it prevented imports from increasing in 
response to higher prices and incomes in Canada."18
fhe principal change that took place in the volume 
and direction of trade in 1948 was the increase of exports 
to the United States which rose from $ 1*057 million in 
1947 to $ 1,516 in 1948. fhis increase was the result of 
the diversion of exports from the sterling area as a 
consequence of the more stringent import controls imposed
i8tf©odly, oj>* cit., p. 218.
by -overseas countries *-;e>nd,.. the removal of Canadian export 
controls* which had prevented Canadian exports of such 
goods as coarse grains and pork from going to the United 
States*,' Another1 factor was the. 'strong demand ■ of American 
prodaeers for primary products produced in Canada due to 
the high-level' of American economic aeiivityv
Another significant development in the volume and 
direction of Canadian trade which took place in 1948 was 
the strong increase in the total Canadian imports from 
the sterling area#. The increase in imports from the 
sterling, area meant that Canada was able to either fi- . 
nance a greater total export to the sterling area-with.a. 
given amount of export credits# or reduce the volume of 
export credits without a decrease in the total Canadian 
exports#'since-the sterling area was paying for imports 
with goods rather than with funds borrowed from Canada# 
Canada chose' the latter alternative, so that the net 
result of the increased imports from .the sterling area 
was the strengthening' of the Canadian export industries 
by preventing, -a decline in total Canadian exports when 
overseas- export credits were reduced*'
Paring lit® .merchandise imports from the'’United 
States were reduced by only $ 189 million* However* the 
net effect' Of the other changes, in the balance of pay­
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ments was a reduction in the demand for American dollars 
and an increase in the amount of hard currency coming from 
the overseas area.
Canadian loans and export credits to foreign coun­
tries amounted to $ 563 million in 1947% In 1948 the 
volume of lending was cut to $ 167 million,. Several fac­
tors were responsible for this reduction* In early 1948 
the drawing rate on the $ 1,250 million export credit to 
Great Britain was reduced, throughout 1948 other debtor 
nations did not draw heavily on their credits due to the 
improvement in their balance of payments or the availa­
bility of Economic Gooperation Administration funds.
Provisions of the United States* Economic Cooper­
ation Act of.1948* which permitted nations receiving 
assistance to make woffshore” purchases in Canada, re­
sulted in the United States financing a large share of 
Canadian exports to the United Kingdom, especially those 
under the food contracts between the two nations. Prior 
to receiving BCA aid the United Kingdom had used Canadian 
export credits to finance a large portion of her food 
imports from Canada* Therefore, BCA financing reduced 
the United Kingdom’s drawings on Canadian export credits 
and permitted Canada to earn increased amounts of United 
States dollars in 1948% The BCA program was also impor­
tant to Canada in that it helped assure a continuation of 
Canadian exports on a-high level in 1949 and subsequent 
years *i9
•to -sawiari'ase the developments of 1948* when foreign 
loans were curtailed and exports wore financed by funds 
provided by the Economic Cooperation Administration, and 
when a larger portion of exports went to the United 
States, the bilateral disequilibrium in the Canadian bal­
ance of payments disappeared* the Canadian government 
gave confirmation of the improvement in the situation when 
it announced on December 15, 1948 that import controls had 
been relaxed on a large number of goods* Early in 1949 
the United Kingdom was permitted to resume drawing on the 
1946 loan at the rate of $ 10 million a month*
fhe basic changes in the Canadian balance of pay­
ments held good in 1949 as exports to the United States 
remained at their high levels and imports from the United 
Kingdom increased* A return of the difficulties of 1946- 
47 was still possible* but highly improbable, Canada was 
dependent upon ECA funds for the financing of a large share 
of its overseas exports. However, the prospects for fhe 
maintenance of the high postwar level of foreign trade
19Ibid., p. 266
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were extremely good* The American demand f or primary 
products such as wood pulp, newsprint, and non-ferrous 
metals was strong due to the high levels of income and 
employment in the United States# The. most doubtful item 
in the Canadian balance of payments on current account in 
1349 was the volume of manufactured exports* The contin­
ued success of this class of exports was dependent upon 
the degree of recovery in the United Kingdom*
The most significant development in Canadian inter­
national finance during 1949 was the September 19th de­
valuation of the Canadian dollar to buying and selling 
rates of $ 1*10 US and $ 1*105 respectively following the 
United Kingdom1 s 30*5 percent reduction in the value of 
the pount sterling# The devaluation had mixed effects on 
the Canadian foreign trade position* The most unfavorable 
of these was the inflation of domestic price levels as a 
result of the rise in the price of imports* The index of 
Canadian wholesale prices rose from 198.3 in 1949 to 211.2 
in 1950. The most favorable effect of the devaluation was 
the increase in merchandise exports to the United States, 
the total value rising from $ 1,529 million in 1949 to 
$ 2,050 million in 1950. However* despite this increase 
in eiqports to the United States Canada experienced a net 
deficit on current account of $ 329 million; the first over-
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all deficit on current account since 1933, fhe net defi­
cit on current account did not, however, put a strain on 
exchange reserves, which increased by $ 655 million during 
1950,
fhe main reason for the favorable growth in exchange 
reserves, despite the unfavorable balance on current ac­
count, was the changed direction of trade and the increased . 
capital inflow from the United States, fhe pattern of Ca­
nadian trade with the main trading areas of the world 
Showed a marked change during 1950^ In 1939 the United 
States supplied 66 percent of Canadian imports while tak­
ing 41 percent of exports*. In 1950 these figures nearly 
balanced, when the United States supplied 67 percent of 
Canadian imports while taking $5 percent of Canadian ex­
ports*
fhe problem of cross payments between bilateral in­
ternational accounts was not serious during 1950, fhe 
devaluation had acted to solidify and make permanent the. 
changes in the direction of trade that had taken place in 
1948 and 1949, fhe overall Canadian balance of payments 
was more nearly in balance despite the fact that it showed 
a deficit oh current account, With the bilateral accounts 
in an approximate balance the former heavy overseas sur­
plus was no longer required as a means of financing, Ear-
135
lag the first ten months: of 1950 exchange reserves in­
creased by $ 560 million due primarily to the heavy inflow 
of capital from the Onited States# A large part of this 
inflow was speculative capital attracted by the devaluation 
of the Canadian dollar and the prospects of an appreciation 
in the exchange rate in the near future* tith the bilat* 
eral accounts already in balance this inflow of American 
capital was not a stabilising factor in the Canadian bal­
ance of payments and it placed a heavy strain on the ex­
change rate 4 Maintaining the official exchange rate in 
the face of this heavy capital inflow meant a strong in­
flationary pressure was placed on the domestic economy, 
the Bank of Canada attempted to offset this pressure by 
raising the discount rate from 1 to 1^ percent In October, 
1950, However, the inflow of capital continued and# when 
the strain on the exchange rate became excessive, the Ca­
nadian government announced that the exchange rate would 
be freed and allowed to seek its own level in the open 
market#
. mm msmam
l i t  f i r s t '  step toward the freeing of th e  Canadian ■
exchange .rate, was taken on September 30, 10S0 when the
Canadian government announced the cancellation of the of*
fieial exchange rate that had' been in f orce since Septem* '
b#r of 1949* fhe rate was left free to find its own
level ss/detefffiiaed'by supply and demand* fhis, however,
does-, not constitute a free; exehange rate since the general
.strnciare’-ef'ejscehange control remained unchanged*! Permit
and license'.provisions for the control of securities
transactions.by residents and non-residents and the pay*
ment of Canadian dollars to non-residents remained in
effect,. The limitation on the issue of these permits’and-
• . *
licenses remained strict:*; It was the government's; inten* 
tion to retain the structure of control is such a way as 
to fora a defence- against possible adverse conditions in 
the future*
ifree exchange, as distinguished from a rate free to 
fluctuate within a framework of control, is one that is 
allowed to fluetitate under the influence of market supply 
and demand without governmental interference of'.any kind*
The immediate cause of the partial freeing of the 
exchange rate was the extremely heavy inflow of specula* 
tlve American capital that followed the devaluation of 
September 1949. From June to September of 1950 exchange 
reserves were increased by $ 543 million and stood at a re 
cord high of $ 1*789 million. The gross inflow of capital 
in the month of September alone was $ 280 million. The 
heavy influx of funds coming as it did in the midst of the 
Canadian investment boom excercised an inflationary force 
at a time when the Canadian government1® economic policy 
in all fields was directed toward combating inflation.
The outstandingly large balance of the Canadian 
exchange reserves that resulted fro# the capital inflow 
meant an increase in Canada*s gross foreign debt and 
annual service charge without a corresponding increase 
in productive resources or the ability to export. This
'■v
type of involuntary borrowing is especially undesirable 
since it represents a potential strain on the balance of 
payments. Since a large portion of the inflow was based 
on speculation as to the future exchange rate, the re­
establishing of parity between the Canadian and American 
dollar would retard the inflow of speculative capital, but 
at the same time it would have an adverse effect on the 
balance bn current account with the United Kingdom. De*
valuation had been undertaken m  a means of keeping' the 
overseas trade in balance, fhe object of the exchange 
controi aUthority: is to select a rate that is consistent 
with fohda^hfat-'conditions and has premise of remaining 
stable*-; 1950 the Canadian situation was such' that it 
was; difficulty if. not impossible, to select one rate that, 
woiild be in complete harmony with fundamental conditions 
and not require strict supervision to maintain*2 An in- 
flexible; exchange rate would hardly have been desirable to 
Canada since it would have forced the domestic economy to 
make immediate adjustments to external situations that were 
essentially shortgun in nature,- The speculative inflow 
of capital is o case in point. If the rate was raised so 
as to ewrtail the inflow of capital, yet at the same time 
was so High that it had an adverse effect on the trade 
with the Overseas area, the rigid maintenance of the high 
rate would mean that the economy would have to suffer all 
the undesirable effects of a reduction in foreign trade to 
avoid the inflationary force of the capital inflow* If ex­
change control Cannot promise to give a reasonably stable 
rate without forcing the economy to make drastic adjust* 
meats to maintain that rate, then it seems that the only
2®-©andd.tao- Exchange Rate,11 International Financial 
Survey* Ilf:- {doteber S*. 1.9i#l,--l.d9*:
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reasonable course is to allow the market forces to deter­
mine the rate;
The final step in the freeing of the exchange rate 
came on December 14, 1951 when the Canadian government 
revoked all existing foreign exchange control regulations* 
This action was the culmination of the gradual relaxation 
of exchange controls that had taken place during 1950 and 
1951, All import restrictions and prohibitions under the 
Emergency Exchange Conservation Act had been removed on 
January 2, 1950. By the time that exchange controls were 
fully eliminated they had come to play only a very small 
part in the operation of the economy.
The decision to abolish controls was not, as the 
decision to allow the rate to fluctuate freely, a means 
of meeting a current problem* Freeing of the exchanges 
has a fundamental implication. It does not mean, as 
D. C. Abbot points out, that the future of the Canadian 
economy is so bright that there would no longer be any 
use for controls.^ Rather it implies that the Canadian 
situation is such that she is better advised to rely on 
the general handling of the domestic economy to maintain
3B. c. Abbot, "Statement to the House of Commons, 
December 14, 1951, Report to the Kinister of Finance 
(Ottawa* Foreign Exchange ControL Board, 3*951), p, IS,
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a reasonable balance with the world instead of attempting 
to administrate the balance* The question narrows down to 
whether continued exchange control as a long-run policy 
would be advantageous to the Canadian economy*
The question is couched in terms of national policy 
and, therefore, must be answered with reference to partic­
ular Canadian conditions and attitudes* However, there is 
also a theoretical issue involved in the decision to free 
exchanges that must not be overlooked. The theoretical 
issue relates to what has been called the ndoetrine of 
alternative stability.18 Simply stated, this doctrine is 
that a nation cannot persue an independent monetary policy 
and at the same time decree a fixed exchange rate*4 A 
nation must choose between internal and external stability, 
Because, if a country has committed itself to a policy of 
maintaining a price level at odds with the world* it will 
necessarily find that its exchange rate will not be stable* 
Which is only to say that when a country follows measures 
to stabilize the internal economy difficulties will arise 
in the balance of payments which can only be met by direct 
controls over imports and other payments or by allowing
4Leland B* Yeager, *An Evaluation of Freely Fluctu­
ating Exchange Kates*8 (unpublished Pectoral Dissertation,
Columbia University, Hew York, 1952), p* 24*
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the exchange rate to depreciate, Meade contends that 
* . , ♦ to work simultaneously for domestic full employ­
ment policies, free trade, and fixed exchange rates, is to 
work for a system which cannot work*00 The Canadian gov­
ernment has a policy of internal monetary stability and a 
policy of full employment which according to the doctrine 
of alternative stability cannot consistently be followed 
when decreeing a fixed exchange rate. Therefore, the 
question of whether it is better to sacrifice internal or 
external stability stands behind the decision to free ex­
changes. The answer to this question can be found in a 
review of Canadian monetary, trade, and fiscal policies, 
resource development and industrialization, and the 
future prospects of the balance of payments.
Monetary policy. For an investment economy like 
that of the United States, where the balance of payments 
is largely determined by internal conditions, it is fea­
sible to seek a correction of balance of payments diffi­
culties by adjusting domestic factors with the convention­
al instruments of monetary policy, viz,, the discount rate 
and open market operations. In an export economy like
5j, E. Meade, "Review of Wilcox*s A Charter for 
World Trade," ficOnomica (May, 1950), 217, (cited by 
Yeager, Ibid.»npT '
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Canada, whose balance of payments is determined mainly by 
conditions abroad, domestic monetary adjustments do not 
offer an sdeouate remedy to balance of payments problems# 
Exchange controls are much more effective than 
conventional domestic monetary policies, because as Mallich 
points out? wEven though exchange control often is a care 
aimed only at the symptoms of the maladjustment, it may be 
the best that can be done when the causes are beyond the 
policymaker’s reach#**®
In general the case against exchange control with 
its technical complications, its difficulty to administer, 
and adverse repercussions is strong when alternative 
monetary policy can be used to divorce internal monetary 
and fiscal affairs from unfavorable external conditions# 
However, in an export economy like Canada, there is a 
relatively greater need for exchange controls that make 
them feasible under the conditions of a unfavorable bal­
ance of payments#
Current account deficits are a serious threat to 
the stability of the Canadian economy# As noted previous­
ly, Canadian exports are predominantly raw materials and 
basic commodities the supply of which is relatively in-
®Henry Christopher Hallich, ffonetarv Problems of an 
Export Economy (Cambridgei Harvard University Press,TW077 pTTBT#
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elastic. Difficulties in financing exports directly af­
fect the level of Canadian economic activity. Exchange 
control, therefore, is a desirable method of meeting def­
icits on current account and preventing disruption in the 
export industry. Another argument in favor of exchange 
control in Canada in place of other monetary policies is 
dependent upon the convertibility of sterling, Goodly 
says that:
, , . when currencies become inconvertible, the 
important policy issues of individual governments 
become exchange rates, methods of avoiding loss of 
reserves, and problems of conducting trade while 
balancing bilateral accounts,7
Under these circumstances traditional monetary policies 
are inadequate and make exchange control necessary.
Another factor favoring exchange controls in Canada is 
the large size of the balance of payments in relation to 
national income.
Exchange controls on capital movements are not 
desirable from the Canadian point of view. Existing Ca­
nadian exchange controls on capital movements were de­
signed to prevent capital flight, iCallich points out 
that: 'The great volume of these movements * « * was made
^Viiliam J, E. Woodly, 3Canada#s Post-Var Balance 
of Fayments; A Case Study of Remedies for Balance of Pay­
ments Disequilibrium" (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 
Cornell University, Ithaca, 1949), p. 17.
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possible only by the high liquidity of the more mature 
economies, a factor that normally is absent in underdevel­
oped countries**'8 Although Canada is not an nodefdevel* 
oped economy her position is such that the major disturb*’ 
ance in the capital account can he due only, to the cessa­
tion of the inflow of capital over a long period rather 
than the flight of domestic funds* Any type of exchange 
control that would discourage foreign investment would be 
a distinct disadvantage to Canada* The Canadian war and 
postwar exchange controls recognised this fact and.made 
special provisions for the withdrawal of funds invested
after controls had been imposed*
in 1950 the main argument for the removal of ex­
change control was that it would help relieve fhe infla­
tionary pressure that was being exerted by the rapid in­
flow of foreign capital* Thus exchange control# although 
able to eope with the balance of payments on current ac* 
count problems of the export economy, cannot offer sta­
bility to the internal economy* It was later found that 
when the rate was freed an appreciation took place due 
to the heavy demand for the Canadian dollar and .the in­
flow of capital slowed down to a point where traditional
8¥allich, op* cit*, p. 258.
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central bank policies could deal with the inflation.
The conclusion then from the viewpoint of monetary 
policy is that exchange control in Canada was desirable 
on current account operations rather than on capital ac­
count, and that in emergency cases such as a deficit on 
current account exchange controls were more desirable 
than traditional monetary policies due to the nature of 
the economy and the structure of the balance of payments.
Trade policy. In relation to trade policy the 
question was whether Canadian exchange controls would 
result in greater gains from international trade. That 
is, by improving the terms of trade it was thought that 
the better trade relations could be achieved. In theory 
exchange controls increase the terms of trade by permit­
ting the maintenance of an overvalued rate of exchange. 
However, in practice only an overvaluation of the most 
severe sort would substantially increase the terms of 
trade in Canada’s favor since the price elasticities of 
goods entering Canada’s foreign trade under the conditions 
that prevail in the postwar world markets were such that 
changes in the par value of exchange would have little 
effect on their volume*^
C, Clark, Canada’s Post-i/ar Finance, Statements
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The dost conclusive argument against control as an 
adjunct to Canadian foreign trade policy is the Canadian 
disposition to import from the Uhited States and to export 
to Western Europe* Experience has shews that exchange 
controls cannot correct this geographic imbalance in the 
patters of trade, especially since* as noted previously, 
the articles exported to Western Europe cannot be sold in 
the United States, Consequently, exchange controls as a 
national policy or as a policy in the world at large 
only aggravate the Canadian situation by making the con­
vertibility of currency difficult or impossible and there* 
by making the balancing of the Canadian payments exceed* 
ihgly difficult*
To summarize, the Canadian foreign trade is espe­
cially opposed to exchange controls as a method of im­
proving the nation’s trade position* Canada*® dependence 
on foreign trade and the geographic imbalance of the trade 
pattern put Canada in a very weak bargaining position in 
bilateral negotiations. Exchange controls can only offer 
temporary relief from Canada’s trade problems so that 
^Canada’s long-run external trade policy seeks the estab-
and Speeches Wo* 52/59* (Ottawa: Department of External 
Affairs, December 29, 1952), p, 11*
lisiusent of- international commerce at the highest level 
possible oh a multilateral basis * • ■  ■
■ /Since-Krerld Mar If Canada has been a strong support* 
er of international ■organizations /■ that attest , t© reduce 
the restrictions on international trade* Canada Is a 
signatory.: of ..the Bret ton Hoods Agreement- and a. participant 
in ;the-,'Iiiteriiatlbnal -Eoneiary Fundf ■ Blyffc contends that? 
"The significance of the Fund to Canada probably lies in 
the place which it has in the efforts for the ■restoration
• . 1 C • ' ' •• .
of international trade on a saul tiiateral basis. Fur­
ther evidence of £anadars opposition, to barriers to -inter­
national trade ©an be found in the-fact that in- the general 
Agreement on tariffs and Trade at the Geneva Conference of 
1948 Canada granted concessions on 1,000 eat Of the 2,000 
items- on her tariff list.
Resource development and indUs.trial.lza.tion. 'there' 
are several ways in which exchange control can be used to ' 
promote resource developiBent and industrialization. One
l^Canadian Government, Department of External Af». 
fair9v-^^BMia■iB,^j^gaigB:.imB&^' lefereace Papers f Ho. 36 
(Ottawa;? department of External Affairs, August, 1948), 
p. 3.
ilc. ij, Biyth, ^some Aspects of canada*s interna- 
tionsl. Financial .Eolations," .Capadl^b dournal of Iconoia* 
ic.S and -Political- fc.leaee:r %It (August, 1946), 311.
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is to give a preferential rate to export industries by re­
straining the importation of competing goods through a
•
licensing system or through unfavorable exchange rates. 
Another way is the diversion of exchange resources from 
imports for domestic consumption to imports of capital 
equipment, A third way is the subsidization of the domes** 
tic industries using imported raw materials through liber­
al allocation of exchange and a favorable rate,12
Canadian attempts to improve domestic industry
through the use of exchange controls have been unsatis­
factory, For instance, under the Emergency Exchange Con­
servation Act and its restrictions of imports incidental 
protection was given to several industries. This protec- 
'tion had the effect of stimulating high cost uneconomic 
production of some of the goods subject to control and 
introduced distortions and rigidities in the Canadian econ­
omy, This ran counter to Canadian interests because as 
Clark points out,
It lias clearly realized, however, that if Canada 
was to continue to market her exports in the United 
States in large volume, It was essential to keep costs 
down, encourage productive efficiency, maintain compe­
tition and retain sufficient flexibility in the econo­
my to permit adjustments to the inevitable shocks of a 
dynamic and rapidly changing world.13
^U'alllch, QP» cit., pp. 264-85,
13Clark, op. cit.. p. 10,
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fhe protective function of exchange control was, therefore, 
undesirable in the Canadian situation* ft protection was 
desired, it could have been better achieved, in the Sana* 
dian case at least, bf direct subsidies* ifallich advances 
two reasons that support this contention!
V
(1) * *; * exchange control as an instrument of pro* 
tecfion lends itself peculiarly to the dispensation of 
special privilege, (!) * . . administrative character 
of exchange control maxes the protection it provides 
rather less certain than that provided by tariffs,*4
Although Canadian exchange controls have been care* 
fully constructed so as not to interfere with the Inflow 
of foreign capital, there is an inherent danger that eon- 
; trols will lead to a decrease in the inflow of foreign 
capital, Canada is practically self-sufficieot in respect 
to capital so that a curtailment of foreign investment 
would not seriously offset the internal development pro­
gram* However, it would have an adverse effect on the 
importation of technical shill that usually accompanies 
direct investment and upon which Canada has been dependent 
in the past for a large part of its innovative progress*
Fiscal policy* Clark has outlined the postwar Ca­
nadian fiscal policy as being directed toward!
14Wallich, op* cit** p. 265,
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(1) smoothing the transition from war to peace,
(2) restoring and maintaining a free enterprise econ­
omy of a dynamic and flexible character, <3) promoting 
a high level of employment and income, and (4) con­
taining the inflationary potential latent in huge war 
deferred demand and high consumer liquidity.iS
Exchange controls could and did play a role in helping to
achieve these objectives, but always this role has been
that of a temporary expedient. Indeed, it could hardly
have been more in view of the strong Canadian presumptiont%
against government interference in economic affairs.
Exchange controls have been important in the fiscal 
policies of hatin American countries mainly because of the 
income that can be secured from differential buying and 
selling rates or a tax on exchange transactions. Although 
in the case of Canada the income from such a practice 
could be substantial, it is extremely doubtful that it 
would be treated as anything but an added inducement to 
having controls. Income could not be the main reason for 
exchange control in the Canadian case.
Foreign repercussions, fhe imposition or continued 
existence of Canadian exchange control is not solely a Ca­
nadian matter. Canada's share in world trade is large and 
many nations are affected by Canada's action on trade mat-
i5Clark, oj>. cit., p. 11.
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ters* The pos twar international f inancial situation is 
such that Canada*s actions in regard to exchange control 
will have/ serious.reperoussions* ' Canada*s role is a dual 
one*, She'has suffered a dollar shortage* hut at the same • 
time the nations of Hesters Europe have been plagued: with: 
a shortage of Canadian dollars* Restrictions on Canadian 
currency have an immediate effect on. Ifestern Europe, which 
depends heavily on daoada for imports* Canadian exchange 
control practice must always keep sight of the fact that 
tight exchanges could lead to a reduction in the over* 
seas trade as a result of the redirection of European 
exports*
Canadian exchange control cannot, however* have 
much effect on multilateral trade* As Ifallich. says, 
"InconvertiMli ty of the currencies of an export economy 
is not nearly so contagious, in fact much less so than in 
proportion to bargaining power and size* The Canadian 
dollar is not a key currency, a fact which further limits 
repercussions on multilateral trade* But since Canada is 
a leading advocate of nniltilaterialismand has a consid­
erable stake in the revestablishment of multilateral trade# 
a policy of exchange control is inconsistent and undesirable*
i%allieh,. op* cit*, p. 271*
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The prospective balance of payments. Among the Ca­
nadian developments that give promise of contributing to 
the correction of the fundamental disequilibrium in the 
balance of payments are the rapidly increasing population, 
expanded resource development, and the prospects of con­
tinued high level of exports to the United States.
The rapid development of Canadian population in 
recent years promises to have a distinct effect on the 
future balance of payments. Watts contends that:
One effect should be to reduce troublesome exports 
surpluses in some products? this is already noticea­
ble in certain foods items where in some instances 
it would not require very much greater local demand 
to mop up present export surpluses.i7
An equally important effect should be the broadening of 
the home market for manufactured items, which are at pre­
sent experiencing difficulty in the export markets. In­
creased population will provide a profitable market for 
the domestic production of goods formerly exported. The 
net effect of increasing population should be a lessening 
of the Canadian susceptibility to variations in foreign 
trade.
^7G* S. Watts, "Some Long Term Factors in the Cana­
dian Balance of International Payments,* Canadian Journal 
fifcWiUSA PffiU.tUa*, Ssd&m&t XVI (February, 1955),'20.
Resource developBients are of the utmost importance 
in assessing the future eondition of the Canadian situa­
tion both internally and.On the balance, of payments, fro* 
grams are under way in the preduo lion, of oil , gold, base ., . 
metals, iron ore, and pulp and paper products. Ail of 
these goods are imported, but the most important in the =' 
point of sine and the balance of payment# is the develop* 
meat of the petroleum resources* Since 1929 imports of 
petroleum have averaged about seven percent of total im­
ports, and around nine percent of imports from the Western 
hemisphere* bevelopmeats in petroleum bear directly on 
the balance of payments with the baited States, Iveh if 
new discoveries do not make Canada self-sufficient\io 
petroleum, they will at least reduce imports which are 
virtually ail of dollar origin* certain mineral develop* 
meats also give great promise of Improving the balance on 
current account with the United States* An increase in 
this class of exports is almost assured* Watts supports 
this contention by saying that better resources of the 
United States have “declined to a point were there will be 
a progressively better market for Canadian metals not only 
for new discoveries, but for a larger portion of current 
outputs as well.^i3 It appears, therefore, that if devel-
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opmental programs in petroleum, base metals, and forest 
products are successful, the net effect will be to reduce 
the chronic deficit on current account with the United 
States,
hemand for Canadian ^xperts* . ■ A significant factor 
in the success of the resource development in particular 
and the stability of the balance of payments in general 
is the level Of American demand for Canadian exports^ 
Conditions in 1949 and 1950 seem to indicate that the bi*- 
lateral disequilibrium in Canada*s international accounts
has been remedied temporarily at least, However, there
» *
was still some evidence of a continuing fundamental . dia* 
equilibrium* the most obvious indication of this under* 
lying situation was the Canadian dependence on HCA funds 
to support a large share of her overseas exports* The 
final remedy for the fundamental disequilibrium rests 
primarily on a permanent shift in the direction of Cana* 
dian trade. The shift that must be made in order to bring 
Canadian trade into line with the state Of world demand 
is an increase in exports to the united States and an in* 
crease in imports from Western Europe and the United King* 
dom* Some success was made along these lines in 1948 and 
1949, but the promise of the continuation of the new de*
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velopments is too slim to sefve as the basis for free ex- 
changes# Developments in 1050, however, have made a con** 
siderable change in the situation* the Korean War'and the 
general unsettled state of international relations have 
caused many nations to institute armaments programs# In 
the economic Sense this bids fair for Canada sinc e her 
exports of raw materials form an important part In the 
armaments programs of many nations, especially the United 
States*
The long-run possibility of stable and diversified 
exports to the United states depends upon the continued 
economic stability at high levels of activity in the 
United States, and upon tariff concessions that would open 
up a larger and more permanent market for Canadian pro­
ducts, which at present are barred from the American mar­
ket, There is, however, definite limits on the size of 
Canadian exports to the United States in normal times since 
the principal components of the trade are goods in the 
field of primary products*
Conclusion* Thus, on the basis of the situation 
that existed in Canada in 1081, the case for exchange con* 
tr'ols was not strong* Although fundamental disequilibrium 
still existed in the balance of payments, there was not
much that exchange control coaid do about remedying it 
since the necessary adjustments were long-run and depend­
ent in large part on conditions outside of Canada, Hit 
general consensus of fiscal* monetary* and trade policy 
was opposed to exchange control as anything hat a tempo* 
rary emergency policy* In fact* the Canadian situation 
was such that a continued use of exchange controls could 
only result in an intensification of the existing prob- 
lems# A change in the rate could not he avoided* but the 
question of what the new rate should be was an unanswer* 
able oho* fhe possibility of choosing an unenforceable 
rate* that is .one which would reduce foreign trade and 
instigate domestic deflation, or one that would en­
courage a continued inflow of speculative capital which
would add to the inflationary tendency of the domestic
* ■ 
economy* were dangers that could only be avoided by al­
lowing the rate to freely fluctuate according to market 
demand and supply. It would seem theft that the classic 
/arguments for free trade and unrestricted international 
financial transactions are especially applicable to the 
Canadian 'case*
fhe Canadian removal of exchange controls is a 
reaffirmation of the validity of the general theory of 
international trade and* even more, a vote of confidence
15?
in its value as a workable and desirable phase of national 
economic policy. However, it is made quite clear by a 
review of the Canadian case that with the modern resurgence 
of mercantilistic policy in the disrupted postwar inter* 
national trade pattern, the classical general theory of 
international trade has in fact become a special case and 
it is only applied with success when the underlying real 
economic conditions in the nation considering policy is* 
sues is identical with those conditions assumed implicit* 
ly or explicitly by the classical theory. One could easi­
ly develop the argument that the Canadian trade situation 
in ,1951*52 is closely akin to that of England during the 
first half of the 19th century when the classical theory 
was formulated. Canada^s situation in the modern world 
is, however, a unique one. fhen Canada is compared with 
her contemporaries, England for example, it becomes obvi­
ous that although the theoretical arguments and abstract 
considerations of the value of free exchange are the 
same, the particular dynamic features of the two economies 
are such that the same working policies are impossible 
or could only be imposed at greatly different costs.
Canada is Fortunate in that the free play of eco­
nomic forces and her particular position are such that she 
was forced to arrive at the decision to free exchanges and
that conscious pciicy formulations were only of secondary
i m p o r t a n c e . . .  • ■' 'V.i;'vv
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